Текст книги "The Arabs: A History"

Автор книги: Eugene Rogan

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In recognition of Ibrahim’s services to the Ottoman state in defeating the Wahhabis, Sultan Mahmud II promoted Muhammad ‘Ali’s son to the rank of pasha and named him governor of the Hijaz. In this way, the Red Sea province of the Hijaz became the first addition to Muhammad ’Ali’s empire. Henceforth, the Egyptian treasury would benefit from the customs revenues of the port of Jidda, which, given its importance in the Red Sea trade and as a gateway for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, were considerable. Muhammad ‘Ali substantially consolidated Egypt’s grip over the Red Sea in 1820 when his forces invaded Sudan. He had hoped to find mythical gold mines in Sudan to enrich his treasury while he sought a new source of slave soldiers for his army in the upper reaches of the Nile. The Sudan campaign was marred by great brutality. When Muhammad ’Ali’s son Ismail was killed by the ruler of Shindi, a region on the Nile to the north of Khartoum, the Egyptian expeditionary force retaliated by killing 30,000 of the local inhabitants. The gold never materialized, and the Sudanese quite literally preferred to die rather than serve in Muhammad ‘Ali’s army. Thousands of men who had been captured for military service became despondent when taken from their homes, fell ill, and perished in the long marches to training camps in Egypt: of 20,000 Sudanese enslaved between 1820 and 1824, just 3,000 survived to 1824.¹³ The only real gains to Egypt of the Sudan campaign (1820–1822) were commercial and territorial. By adding Sudan to Egypt’s empire, Muhammad ’Ali doubled the land mass under his control and dominated the trade of the Red Sea. Egypt’s hegemony over Sudan would endure 136 years, until Sudan regained its independence in 1956. Muhammad ‘Ali faced a severe constraint in the shortage of new recruits for the Egyptian army. His original Albanian forces had been decimated by wars in Arabia and the Sudan, and by age as well. By the time of the Sudan campaign, the surviving Albanians in Muhammad ?Ali?s army had been in Egypt twenty years. The Ottomans had placed an embargo on the export of military slaves from the Caucasus to Egypt in 1810, both to prevent a Mamluk revival and to contain the ambitions of Muhammad ?Ali himself. Nor were the Ottomans willing to send any of the empire?s soldiers to serve Muhammad ?Ali when they were needed on the European fronts. With no external source of new soldiers, the governor of Egypt was forced back on his own population. The idea of a national army—a conscript force that drew its ranks from the workers and peasants of the country—was still novel in the Ottoman world. Soldiers were seen as a martial caste taken from slave ranks. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the famous Ottoman infantry known as the Janissaries did modify their recruitment procedures as the devshirme (“boy levy”) fell out of practice. Soldiers took wives and enrolled their sons in the Janissaries’ ranks. But the notion of a military caste distinct from the rest of the population persisted. Peasants were dismissed as too passive and dull for military service. As the Ottomans began to lose wars to European armies in the eighteenth century, the sultans came to doubt the effectiveness of their own infantry. They invited retired Prussian and French officers to Istanbul to introduce modern European methods of warfare, such as square formation, bayonet charges, and the use of mobile artillery. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Sultan Selim III (r. 1780–1807) created a new Ottoman army recruited from Anatolian peasant stock dressed in European-style breeches and drilled by Western officers. He called this new force the Nizam-i Cedid, or “New Order” army (its soldiers were known as Nizami troops). Sultan Selim deployed a 4,000-man Nizami regiment to Egypt in 1801, where Muhammad ‘Ali would have seen the discipline of the corps firsthand. As one Ottoman contemporary recorded, the Nizami troops in Egypt “bravely combated the infidels and defeated them incessantly; and the flight of a single individual of that corps was never seen nor heard of.”¹⁴ However, the Nizami forces were a more immediate threat to the powerful Janissary corps than to any European army. If the Nizamis were the “new order,” the Janissaries were by implication the “old order,” and they weren’t going to accept redundancy while they still had the power to protect their own interests. In 1807 the Janissaries mutinied, overthrew Selim III, and disbanded the Nizami army. Though this first experiment in an Ottoman national army came to an inauspicious end, it still provided Muhammad ’Ali with a viable model to replicate in Egypt. The Napoleonic army gave Muhammad ‘Ali a second model to consider. The French levйe en masse was a citizen’s mass army that, when led by able commanders, had proven capable of conquering continents. However, Muhammad ’Ali viewed the people of Egypt as subjects rather than citizens, and he never tried to stir his troops with rousing ideological slogans as did French revolutionary commanders. He decided to draw on French military experts to train his recruit army, but otherwise he modeled the Egyptian Nizam-i Cedid on the Ottoman example. In 1822 he commissioned a veteran of the Napoleonic wars named Colonel S?ves?a French convert to Islam known in Egypt as Sulayman Agha?to organize and train a Nizami army drawn entirely from Egyptian peasant recruits. Within a year he had raised a force of 30,000 men. By the mid-1830s, that number would reach 130,000. The Egyptian Nizami army was not an overnight success. Egyptian peasants feared for their farms and the welfare of their families; their close attachment to their homes and villages made military service a real ordeal. Peasants avoided conscription by fleeing their villages when military recruitment teams approached. Others deliberately maimed themselves by chopping off fingers or striking out an eye to gain exemption on grounds of disability. Whole regions rose in revolt against the draft, and in Upper Egypt an estimated 30,000 villagers rebelled in 1824. Once pressed into military service, many peasants deserted. It was only through heavy punishment that Muhammad ’Ali’s government was able to force the peasants of Egypt to serve in the army. The astonishing thing is how successful this reluctant army proved on the battlefield. It was first put to the test in Greece. In 1821 the Greek provinces of the Ottoman Empire erupted in a nationalist uprising. The revolt was initiated by members of a secret society known as the Filiki Etairia, or the “Society of Friends,” established in 1814 with the goal of Greek statehood and independence. The Greeks of the Ottoman Empire were a distinct community held together by their language, their Orthodox Christian faith, and a shared history spanning the classical period to the Hellenic Byzantine Empire. As the first overtly nationalist uprising in the Ottoman Empire, the Greek War posed a danger of much greater magnitude than the eighteenth-century revolts by local leaders. In previous revolts, movements had been driven only by the ambitions of individual leaders. The novelty of nationalism was that it was an ideology capable of inspiring a whole population to rise up against their Ottoman rulers. The revolt broke out in the southern Peloponnesian Peninsula in March 1821 and quickly spread to central Greece, Macedonia, the Aegean islands, and Crete. The Ottomans found themselves fighting pitched battles on several fronts simultaneously, and they turned to Muhammad ’Ali for assistance. In 1824 his son Ibrahim Pasha set off for the Peloponnesian Peninsula at the head of an Egyptian army of 17,000 newly trained infantry, 700 cavalry, and four artillery batteries. As all of his soldiers were native-born peasants, it is the first time we can speak of a genuinely Egyptian army. The Egyptians achieved complete success in the Greek War, and the new Nizami army proved its mettle. Following his conquests in Crete and the Peloponnese, Ibrahim Pasha was awarded the governorships of those provinces, expanding Muhammad ‘Ali’s empire from the Red Sea to the Aegean. Ironically, the better his forces fared on the battlefield against the Greeks, the more concerned the sultan and his government grew. The Egyptians were subduing insurgencies that had withstood the Ottomans and expanding the territory under Cairo?s control. If Muhammad ?Ali were to rise in rebellion, it was not clear that the Ottomans would be able to withstand his troops. Egyptian victory and Greek suffering provoked concern in European capitals as well. The Greek War captured the imaginations of educated elites in Britain and France. As the cities of the classical world became modern battlefields, European Philhellenic societies clamored for their governments to intervene to protect the Christian Greeks from the Muslim Turks and Egyptians. The poet Lord Byron drew international attention to the Greek cause when he sailed to Messolonghi in 1823 to support the independence movement. His death in April 1824—of a fever, not at the hands of Ottoman soldiers—elevated him to the status of a martyr for the cause of Greek independence. Public calls for European intervention redoubled in the aftermath of Byron’s death. The British and French governments were susceptible to public pressure but were more concerned with larger geostrategic considerations. France had developed a privileged relationship with Muhammad ’Ali’s Egypt. In turn, the governor of Egypt made use of French military advisors for his army, drew on French engineers for his industrial needs and public works, and sent his students to France for advanced training. The French were keen to preserve their special relationship with Egypt as a means to extend their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The expansion of Egyptian power to Greece, however, posed a dilemma for the government in Paris. It would not serve France’s interests to see Egypt grow stronger than France itself in the Eastern Mediterranean. The situation was more clear-cut for the British government. London watched Paris extend its influence in Egypt with mounting concern. Since Napoleon’s invasion, the British had sought to prevent France from dominating Egypt and the land-sea route to India. Britain had also been scarred by the continental wars of the Napoleonic era and worried that attempts by strong European powers to secure positions in Ottoman territory could reignite conflict between the European powers. The British government thus sought to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire to preserve the peace in Europe. It was clear that the Ottomans could not retain Greece on their own, and the British did not wish to see Egypt extend its power into the Balkans at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, British interests would best be served by assisting the Greeks to achieve greater autonomy within the Ottoman Empire and securing a withdrawal of both Ottoman and Egyptian troops from the disputed territories. Muhammad ‘Ali had nothing left to gain from his campaign in Greece. The war proved a tremendous drain on his treasury. His new Nizami army was overextended across Greece. The Ottomans were treating him with growing suspicion and clearly doing their best to deplete his army and his treasury. By the summer of 1827 the European powers had made clear their opposition to Egypt?s position in Greece and had assembled a combined Anglo-French fleet to force an Ottoman and Egyptian withdrawal. The last thing the governor of Egypt wanted was to engage the European powers on the battlefield. As Muhammad ?Ali wrote to his political agent in Istanbul in October 1827, ?We have to realize that we cannot stand up against the Europeans, and the only possible outcome [if we do so] will be sinking the entire fleet and causing the death of up to 30 or 40 thousand men.? Though he was proud of his army and navy, Muhammad ?Ali knew they were no match for the British or the French. ?Although we are men of war,? he wrote, ?yet we are still in the A-B-Cs of that art, whereas the Europeans are way ahead of us and have put their theories [about war] into practice.?¹⁵ Though he had a clear vision of possible disaster, Muhammad ’Ali committed his navy to the cause and dispatched his fleet to Greece. The Ottomans were unwilling to concede independence to Greece, and the sultan decided to call the European powers’ bluff and ignore their joint fleet. It was a fatal mistake. The allied fleet trapped the Egyptian ships in Navarino Bay and sank virtually all the seventy-eight Ottoman and Egyptian ships in a four-hour engagement on October 20, 1827. Over 3,000 Egyptian and Ottoman men were killed in the battle, along with nearly 200 men in the attacking allied fleet. Muhammad ‘Ali was furious at his losses and held Sultan Mahmud II responsible for the loss of his navy. Moreover, the Egyptians found themselves in the same position Napoleon had been in after the Battle of the Nile: thousands of soldiers were trapped, with no ships to provision or repatriate them. Muhammad ’Ali negotiated directly with the British to conclude a truce and repatriate his son Ibrahim Pasha and the Egyptian army from Greece without consulting the sultan. Mahmud II was outraged by his governor’s insubordination, but Muhammad ‘Ali no longer sought the sultan’s favor. His days of loyal service were through. Henceforth, Muhammad’Ali would pursue his own objectives at the sultan’s expense. Navarino was also a turning point in the Greek war of independence. Assisted by a French expeditionary force, Greek fighters drove Ottoman troops out of the Peloponnesian Peninsula and central Greece in the course of the year 1828. That December the governments of Britain, France, and Russia met and agreed to the creation of an independent Kingdom of Greece, then imposed their solution on the Ottoman Empire. After three more years of negotiations, the Kingdom of Greece was finally established in the London Conference of May 1832.

In the aftermath of the Greek debacle, Muhammad ‘Ali trained his sights on Syria. He had aspired to rule over Syria since 1811, when he first agreed to lead the campaign against the Wahhabis. He petitioned the Porte for Syria both in 1811 and again after the defeat of the Wahhabis in 1818. The Ottomans rebuffed him both times, not wanting their governor in Egypt to become too powerful to serve the Porte?s purposes. When Istanbul sought Egypt?s assistance in Greece, the Porte held out the prospect of conferring Syria on Muhammad ?Ali. The Egyptian governor called this debt due after the loss of his fleet in Navarino, but to no avail: the Porte believed Muhammad ?Ali had been sufficiently weakened by his losses that it was no longer necessary to earn his goodwill. Muhammad ‘Ali recognized that the Porte had no intention of ever conceding Syria to him. He also knew the Ottomans had no force to prevent him from taking the territory for himself. No sooner had Ibrahim Pasha and his soldiers been repatriated to Egypt than Muhammad ’Ali set about building a new fleet and reequipping his army to invade Syria. He approached both the British and the French to gain their support for his ambitions. France showed some interest in entering into an agreement with the Egyptians, but Britain continued to oppose all threats to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Undeterred, Muhammad ’Ali continued his preparations, and in November 1831 Ibrahim Pasha set off at the head of an invasion force to conquer Syria. The Egyptian army was now at war with the Ottoman Empire. Ibrahim Pasha led his 30,000 men in the rapid conquest of Palestine. By the end of November his army had reached the northern stronghold of Acre. As reports of Egyptian movements reached Istanbul, the sultan sent a special envoy to persuade Muhammad ’Ali to call off his attack. When this had no effect, the Porte then called on its governors in Damascus and Aleppo to raise an army to repel the Egyptian invaders. They enjoyed a six-month window of opportunity while the Egyptian army laid siege to the near-impregnable fortress of Acre. While the Ottomans prepared to repel the Egyptian invasion, some of the local leaders in Palestine and Lebanon chose to lend their support to Ibrahim Pasha to preserve their positions in the face of the new Egyptian threat. Amir Bashir II, the ruler of Mount Lebanon, entered into alliance with Ibrahim Pasha when the Egyptian army reached Acre. One of the members of Amir Bashir’s ruling Shihabi family sent his trusted advisor, Mikhayil Mishaqa, to observe the Egyptian siege of Acre and report back to the rulers of Mount Lebanon. Mishaqa spent nearly three weeks in Acre, following Egyptian operations first-hand. When he arrived, Mishaqa witnessed a fierce battle between the Egyptian navy and the Ottoman defenders in Acre. Muhammad ’Ali had committed twenty-two warships to the siege, and they fired more than 70,000 rounds into the citadel of Acre. The defenders put up a stiff fight and managed to disable many of the ships in heated exchanges. “Acre,” Mishaqa wrote, “could not even be seen for the smoke of gunpowder” in shelling that lasted from morning to sunset. According to Mishaqa’s sources, the Egyptians fielded eight regiments of foot soldiers (18,000 men), eight cavalry regiments (4,000 men), and 2,000 Bedouin irregulars against ?three thousand brave and experienced soldiers? defending Acre. Given the strength of Acre?s sea walls and the earthworks protecting its land walls, Mishaqa warned his employers to expect a long siege. For six months the Egyptians pummeled the fortress of Acre. By May 1832, the impregnable walls of the castle had been sufficiently reduced for Ibrahim Pasha to assemble his infantry to storm the citadel. He gave a rousing speech, reminding his veterans of their victories in Arabia and Greece. Retreat was not an option for the Egyptian army. To reinforce the point that there would be no turning back, Ibrahim Pasha warned that “cannons would be brought up behind them to blast any soldier who returned without having taken the walls.” With these menacing words of encouragement, Ibrahim Pasha led his men in a charge on the shattered walls of Acre. They easily overran the ramparts and forced the surrender of the surviving defenders, reduced by months of fighting to just 350 men.¹⁶ With Acre now secured, Ibrahim Pasha set off for Damascus. The city’s Ottoman governor mobilized 10,000 civilians in defense. Ibrahim Pasha knew that untrained civilians would not fight a professional army and ordered his troops to fire over their heads to frighten away the defenders. Sure enough, the sound of gunfire was enough to dispel the Damascenes. The governor retreated from the city to join Ottoman forces further north, and the Egyptians entered Damascus unopposed. Ibrahim Pasha ordered his soldiers to respect the townspeople and their property, and he declared a general amnesty for all the people of Damascus. As he intended to rule over the people of Syria, he had no wish to alienate them. Ibrahim Pasha appointed a ruling council for Damascus and continued his relentless march to conquer Syria. The Egyptian commander took some of the notables of Damascus with him to ensure the townspeople would not revolt in his absence. Mikhayil Mishaqa once again followed the Egyptian campaign, gathering intelligence for the rulers of Mount Lebanon. As the Egyptians marched out of Damascus, he took a tally of their numbers: “eleven thousand foot soldiers, two thousand regular cavalry, three thousand [Bedouin] cavalry”—16,000 men in all, supported by forty-three cannons, and 3,000 transport camels for supplies and materiel. They marched to the town of Homs in central Syria, where they were joined by a further detachment of 6,000 Egyptian troops. On July 8, the Egyptians engaged the Ottomans in their first major battle for control of Syria near the town of Homs. “It was a stirring sight,” Mishaqa wrote. “When the regular Egyptian troops reached the battlefield, they were met by the more numerous regular Turkish troops. One hour before sunset the battle raged between the two sides with continuous fire of guns and cannon.” From his hilltop, Mishaqa could not make out which way the battle would go. “It was a frightful hour, during which the very gates of hell were opened. At sundown the noise of guns was quieted, leaving only the pounding of cannon until an hour and a half after sunset, when total silence reigned.? Only then did he learn that the Egyptians had secured total victory in the Battle of Homs. The fleeing Ottoman commanders had abandoned their camp in their haste. ?Food was left burning over the fire, and medicine chests, rolls of dressing and shrouds [for the dead], a great number of furs and mantles for awards and much materiel were all left behind.¹⁷ The restless Ibrahim Pasha did not linger in Homs. One day after his victory, he drove his army northward to Aleppo to complete his conquest of Syria. Like Damascus, Aleppo surrendered without resisting the Egyptian army, and Ibrahim Pasha left behind a new administration to govern the city on Egypt’s behalf. The Ottoman governor had withdrawn to join a large Ottoman army that included the surviving units from the Battle of Homs. On July 29 the Ottomans engaged the Egyptian army in the village of Belen, near the port of Alexandretta (now in modern Turkey, but at the time part of the province of Aleppo). Though outnumbered, the Egyptian forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Ottomans before accepting their surrender. Ibrahim Pasha then marched his forces to the port of Adana, where Egyptian ships could resupply his exhausted army. Ibrahim Pasha sent dispatches to Cairo detailing Egypt’s victories and awaited further orders from his father. Muhammad ’Ali moved from warfare to negotiations, trying to secure his gains in Syria either by the sultan’s edict or through European intervention. The Ottomans, for their part, were unwilling to concede any gains to their renegade governor in Egypt. Rather than recognize his position in Syria, the Ottoman grand vizier (or prime minister) Mehmed Reshid Pasha began to mobilize a massive army of over 80,000 men to drive the Egyptians from the Turkish coast and out of Syria altogether. After rebuilding his army and his stores, Ibrahim Pasha set off into Central Anatolia in October 1832 to face down the Ottoman threat. He occupied the city of Konya that month, where he prepared for battle. The Egyptian army would now have to fight in the most inhospitable environment imaginable. Used to the desert heat of summer and the temperate winters along the Nile, the Egyptian troops found themselves in the driving snow and subfreezing temperatures of winter on the Anatolian plateau. Yet even in such conditions, the unwilling conscripts proved the more disciplined army, and though outnumbered, they secured a total victory over Ottoman troops in the Battle of Konya (December 21, 1832). The Egyptians even managed to take the grand vizier prisoner, which strengthened their bargaining position enormously. Upon receiving news of his army’s defeat and the capture of his grand vizier, the sultan capitulated and agreed to most of Muhammad ‘Ali’s territorial demands. He had no military options following the defeat of his army at Konya, and he now faced an Egyptian army billeted in the western Anatolian town of Kьtahya, just 200 kilometers (124 miles) from the imperial capital, Istanbul. In order to secure a complete withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Anatolia, Mahmud II reestablished Muhammad?Ali as governor of Egypt (he had been stripped of the title and declared a renegade following his invasion) and conferred the provinces of Hijaz, Crete, Acre, Damascus, Tripoli, and Aleppo on Muhammad ?Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, with the right to collect taxes from the port city of Adana. These gains were confirmed in the May 1833 Peace of K?tahya, brokered by Russia and France. Following the Peace of Kьtahya, Ibrahim Pasha withdrew his troops to Syria and Egypt. Muhammad ’Ali had not achieved the independence to which he had aspired. The Ottomans had bound him firmly to their empire’s rule. But he had secured most of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire for his family’s rule, creating an Egyptian empire that rivaled the Ottomans for the rest of the 1830s. Egyptian rule proved very unpopular in Syria. A new tax laid a heavy burden on all layers of society, from the poorest worker to the richest merchant, and local leaders were alienated when they were stripped of their traditional powers. “When the Egyptians began to alter the customs of the clans and institute more taxation of the inhabitants than they were accustomed to pay,” Mishaqa recorded, “the people began to despise them and, wishing for the rule of the Turks back again, manifested signs of rebellion.” The Egyptians responded by disarming and conscripting the Syrians into their service, which only compounded the opposition. “A soldier had no fixed period of service after which he would be free to return to his family, but rather his service was as everlasting as hell,” Mishaqa explained.¹⁸ Many young men took flight to avoid conscription, further undermining productivity in the local economy. Rebellion spread from the Alawite Mountains on the Syrian coast to the Druze in Mount Lebanon and southern Syria, to Nablus in the Palestinian highlands. Between 1834 and 1839, Ibrahim Pasha found his troops pinned down in the suppression of an accelerating cycle of revolts. Muhammad ‘Ali was undeterred by popular unrest in the Syrian countryside and viewed Syria as a permanent addition to his Egyptian empire. He worked assiduously to gain European support for a plan to secede from the Ottoman Empire and to establish an independent kingdom in Egypt and Syria. In May 1838 he informed the Porte and the European powers of his determination to establish his own kingdom, offering the Ottomans a severance fee of Ј3 million ($15 million). British Prime Minister Palmerston responded with a stern warning that “the Pasha [Muhammad ’Ali] must expect to find Great Britain taking part with the Sultan in order to obtain redress for so flagrant a wrong done to the Sultan, and for the purpose of preventing the Dismemberment of the Turkish empire.”¹⁹ Even Muhammad ’Ali’s French allies warned him against taking measures that would draw him into confrontation with both the sultan and Europe. Buoyed by European support, the Ottomans decided to take immediate action against Muhammad ’Ali. Sultan Mahmud II mobilized another massive campaign force. Since the violent disbanding of the Janissaries in 1826, Mahmud had made great investments in a new Ottoman Nizami army. His top officers assured him that his modern German-trained infantry was more than a match for the Egyptians, battle-weary after five years of suppressing popular rebellions in Syria. The Ottomans marched to the Syrian frontiers near Aleppo and attacked Ibrahim Pasha?s forces on June 24, 1839. Contrary to all expectations, the Egyptians routed the Ottomans in the Battle of Nezib, inflicting massive casualties and taking more than 10,000 prisoners. Sultan Mahmud II never received word of his army’s defeat. Suffering from tuberculosis, the sultan’s health had been deteriorating for months, and he died on June 30 before learning of the disaster at Nezib. He was succeeded by his adolescent son, Sultan Abdulmecid I (r. 1839–1861), whose youth and inexperience did little to calm nerves among the commanders of the empire. The admiral of the Ottoman fleet, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, sailed his entire navy across the Mediterranean and placed it under Muhammad ‘Ali’s command. The admiral feared the fleet might fall to Russian control if, as he expected, they intervened to prop up the young sultan. He also believed Muhammad ’Ali to be the leader most capable of preserving the Ottoman Empire; a virile rebel would make a better sultan than a callow crown prince. Panic spread across Istanbul. The young sultan faced the greatest internal threat in Ottoman history with no army or navy to defend him. The European powers were no less concerned by the turmoil in Ottoman domains than the Ottomans themselves. Britain feared that Russia would take advantage of the power vacuum to seize the Straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles to secure access for its Black Sea fleet to enter the Mediterranean. This would overturn decades of British policies designed to contain the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and deny it access to warm water ports, preserving the balance of maritime power to Britain’s advantage. The British also hoped to frustrate French ambitions to extend its ally Egypt’s rule over the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain headed a coalition of European powers (from which France abstained) to intervene in the crisis, both to shore up the Ottoman dynasty and to force Muhammad ’Ali to withdraw from Turkey and Syria. Negotiations dragged on for one year, as Muhammad ‘Ali tried to leverage his victory at Nezib to secure more territorial and sovereign privileges, while the British and the Porte pressed for Egypt’s withdrawal from Syria. In July 1840 the European coalition—Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—offered Muhammad ’Ali lifetime rule over Damascus and hereditary rule over Egypt if his soldiers withdrew from the rest of Syria immediately. With the British and Austrian fleet assembling in the Eastern Mediterranean to take action, it was their last offer. Believing he had the support of France, Muhammad ’Ali rejected the offer. The allied fleet approached the port city of Beirut under the command of British Admiral Napier, and on September 11 they bombarded Egyptian positions. The British used local agents to circulate pamphlets throughout Syria and Lebanon calling on the local people to rise up against the Egyptians. The people of Greater Syria had done so in the past, and were only too happy to do so again. The allied fleet meanwhile proceeded from Beirut to Acre to drive the Egyptians from the citadel. The Egyptians had assumed they could withstand any attack, but the joint Anglo-Austrian-Ottoman fleet took the citadel within three hours and twenty minutes, according to Mikhayil Mishaqa. The Egyptians had just taken delivery of gunpowder, which lay stacked and exposed in the center of the citadel. A shot from one of the allied ships detonated the powder ?in such an unexpected fashion that the soldiers inside Acre fled, leaving no one to defend it.?²⁰ The European and Ottoman forces retook Acre and established their control over the whole of the Syrian coast. Ibrahim Pasha found his position increasingly untenable. Cut off from the sea, he had no means to resupply his troops, which were now constantly harassed by the local population. He withdrew his forces from Turkey and all parts of Syria to Damascus. As soon as his soldiers—some 70,000 in all—had assembled in Damascus, Ibrahim Pasha began an orderly withdrawal from Syria along the overland route to Egypt in January 1841.