Текст книги "The Arabs: A History"

Автор книги: Eugene Rogan

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The Mamluk leader ‘Ali Bey had a number of nicknames. Some of his contemporaries called him Jinn ’Ali, or ‘Ali the Genie, as though he used magic to achieve the seemingly impossible. His Turkish nickname was Bulut Kapan, or “cloud-catcher,” for his repression of the Bedouin, whom the Ottomans believed to be harder to capture than clouds. He is best known as ’Ali Bey al-Kabir, or “the great,” and indeed between 1760 and 1775 he achieved more greatness than any Mamluk in the history of Ottoman Egypt. ‘Ali Bey came to Egypt in 1743 as a fifteen-year-old military slave in the leading Qazdughli Mamluk household. He rose through the ranks and gained his freedom and promotion to the rank of bey on the death of his master in 1755. The beys were the top of the Mamluk hierarchy, whose leader was the shaykh al-Balad, or “commander of the city.” ’Ali Bey first attained primacy in 1760, and he held the office with brief exceptions until his death in 1773. ’Ali Bey was a warlord who engendered respect through fear. His contemporary, the great Egyptian historian al-Jabarti, described him as “a man of great strength, obstinate and ambitious, and satisfied only with supremacy and sovereignty. He showed inclination only for the serious, never for the playful, a joke or fun.”¹⁵ He is said to have had a physical effect on those who met him: ?He was so awe-inspiring that some people actually died in awe of him, and many men would tremble at his mere presence.?¹⁶ He was utterly ruthless in the suppression of his rivals, and he showed loyalty to no one. Nor, as subsequent events would demonstrate, did he engender loyalty in others. He broke the bonds of collegiality and turned against fellow Mamluks of his own household, just as he eliminated rival Mamluk households. ‘Ali Bey was the first person to rule Egypt single-handedly since the fall of the Mamluk Empire. He literally monopolized the wealth of Egypt by seizing the land revenues, controlling all external trade, and demanding extraordinary sums from the European merchant community. He extorted the wealth from the local Christian and Jewish communities and withheld payment of all taxes to Istanbul. ’Ali Bey’s riches allowed him to expand his military power. Having broken the existing Mamluk factions in Egypt, ’Ali Bey set about establishing a new Mamluk household of his own. He bought and trained his own slaves, who were the only people he felt he could trust. His household numbered some 3,000 Mamluks at its height, many of them commanders of vast armies that numbered in the tens of thousands. Having established paramount control over Egypt, ‘Ali Bey sought his independence from Ottoman rule altogether. Inspired by the Mamluks of old, he tried to re-create their empire in Egypt, Syria, and the Hijaz. According to Jabarti, ’Ali Bey was an avid reader of Islamic history who used to lecture his retainers on how Ottoman rule in Egypt was fundamentally illegitimate. “The kings of Egypt—Sultan Baybars and Sultan Qalawun and their children—were Mamluks like us,” he argued. “As for these Ottomans, they seized the country by force, taking advantage of the duplicity of the local people.”¹⁷ The implication was that land taken by force could be redeemed legitimately by force. ‘Ali Bey’s first targets were the governors and troops sent by Istanbul to uphold the law in Egypt. The governors had long since given up trying to rule Egypt—the rival Mamluk households did that. Instead, they sought to uphold Istanbul’s nominal sovereignty by observing ceremonies of power and trying to collect the treasury’s due. Powerless in their own right, the governors tried to play the rival Mamluk households against each other. This was no longer possible under ’Ali Bey, who had eliminated his rivals and ruled unchallenged. Now ’Ali Bey deposed and, it was rumored, even poisoned governors and commanding officers with impunity. The threat to Ottoman interests in their rich but rebellious Egyptian province could not be more acute. ‘Ali Bey next deployed his military power against the Ottoman Empire in an open bid for territorial expansion. “He was not content with what God had granted him,” al-Jabarti wrote, “the rule over Lower and Upper Egypt, the kingdom of which kings and pharaohs had been proud. His greed pushed him to extend the territory of the kingdom.”¹⁸ ’Ali Bey first seized the Red Sea province of the Hijaz, formerly part of the Mamluk Empire, in 1769. Following this success, he began to strike coins bearing his name rather than that of the reigning Ottoman sultan, signaling his rebellion against Ottoman sovereignty. ?Ali Bey had embarked on his project for the restoration of the Mamluk Empire of old. The Ottomans, tied up with their wars with Russia, were powerless to stop him.

‘Ali Bey’s revolt against the Ottomans was in full swing when Zahir al-’Umar first approached him in 1770 with the offer of an alliance against the governor of Damascus. His timing could not have been better. “When ‘Ali Bey received this news,” a contemporary chronicler noted, “he viewed it as the fulfillment of his greatest aspirations. He resolved to rebel against the Ottoman state, and to extend his rule over the lands from ’Arish in Egypt to Baghdad.”¹⁹ ‘Ali Bey concluded an alliance with Zahir al-’Umar and agreed to unseat the Ottoman governor in Damascus. ‘Ali Bey escalated the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean when he wrote to the sultan’s nemesis, the empress Catherine the Great of Russia, to seek her assistance in his war against the Ottomans. He asked Catherine for Russian ships and cavalry to drive the Ottomans out of Greater Syria, in return promising to help the Russians conquer territory in southern Persia. Although the empress refused to provide cavalry, she agreed to the assistance of the Russian fleet, which was then roaming the Eastern Mediterranean. ’Ali Bey’s treason had not escaped the notice of the Ottoman government. However, pinned down by Russian forces in the Black Sea and Eastern Europe, the Ottomans were in no position to stop him. Encouraged by his alliances with Catherine and Zahir, ‘Ali Bey began to mobilize his forces. He raised an army of some 20,000 men to invade Syria under the command of one of his most trusted generals, a Mamluk named Isma’il Bey. In November 1770 the Mamluk force swept through Gaza; following a four-month siege, it occupied the port of Jaffa. Zahir and his men joined forces with Isma’il Bey and accompanied the Mamluk army on its march through Palestine. They crossed the Jordan Valley and headed east to the Pilgrimage Road along the desert’s edge. The rebel army then made haste toward Damascus, intent on seizing the city from its Ottoman governor. They got as far as the village of Muzayrib, one day’s march south of Damascus. When Isma‘il Bey entered Muzayrib he came face to face with the governor of Damascus—and he completely lost the will to fight. It was then the pilgrimage season, when pious Muslims were fulfilling one of the pillars of Islam and making the perilous journey through the desert from Damascus to Mecca. ’Uthman Pasha, the governor, was carrying out his duties as commander of the pilgrimage. Isma‘il Bey was a pious man who had received more religious education than most Mamluks. To attack the governor at that moment would have been a crime against religion. Without warning or explanation, Isma’il Bey ordered his soldiers to withdraw from Muzayrib and return to Jaffa. The astonished Zahir al-‘Umar protested in vain, and the rebel campaign came to a complete halt for the rest of the winter of 1770–1771. ?Ali Bey must have been furious with Isma?il Bey. In May 1771 he sent a second force to Syria, headed by Muhammad Bey, nicknamed ?Abu al-Dhahab,? or ?the father of gold.? He had earned his nickname through a flamboyant gesture: when?Ali Bey promoted Muhammad to the rank of bey and gave him his freedom, Muhammad Bey threw gold coins to the crowds that lined the street between the Citadel and the center of town. It was a public relations coup that made Muhammad Bey a household name. Muhammad Bey set off at the head of 35,000 troops. They swept through southern Palestine and in Jaffa united with the army commanded by Isma‘il Bey. The combined Mamluk forces of Isma’il Bey and Muhammad Bey were unstoppable. They marched through Palestine and, after a minor engagement, drove the Ottoman governor out of Damascus in June. The Mamluks were now in control of Egypt, the Hijaz, and Damascus—’Ali Bey had nearly fulfilled his life’s ambition to reconstruct the Mamluk Empire. Then the unthinkable happened: without warning or explanation, Muhammad Bey abandoned Damascus and set course for Cairo at the head of his army. Once again it was the pious Mamluk general Isma‘il who was to blame. No sooner did the Mamluk commanders find themselves in control of Damascus than Isma’il Bey confronted Muhammad Bey with the enormity of their crime—not just against the sultan but against their religion as well. Isma‘il Bey had spent some time in Istanbul before entering ’Ali Bey’s service, which instilled in him reverence for the sultan’s position as head of the greatest Islamic empire of his day. He warned Muhammad Bey that the Ottomans would not allow such a major rebellion go unpunished in this life and that God would hold them accountable in the afterlife. “For truly rebellion against the Sultan is one of the schemes of the Devil,” Isma’il Bey warned Muhammad Bey. Once Isma‘il Bey had provoked Muhammad Bey’s anxiety, he turned next to play upon the latter’s ambition. ’Ali Bey, he argued, had left the path of Islam by entering into a pact with the Russian empress against the sultan. “Now any Muslim would be permitted by Islamic law to kill [‘Ali Bey] with impunity, claim his harem and his wealth,” Isma’il Bey argued.²⁰ Essentially, Isma‘il Bey reasoned that Muhammad Bey would gain redemption before God and the sultan, and promotion to ’Ali Bey’s position of primacy over Egypt, by turning against his master. Isma‘il Bey’s arguments carried the day, and two of ’Ali Bey’s most trusted generals were now returning to Egypt at the head of a huge Mamluk army bent on the overthrow of their former master.

Shock waves reverberated around the Eastern Mediterranean after the Mamluks’ conquest and rapid abandonment of Damascus. “The people of Damascus were completely astonished by this amazing event,” a contemporary chronicler exclaimed, and so too were Zahir al-‘Umar and his allies. While the Mamluk forces were attacking Damascus, Zahir had taken the town of Sidon and had placed a 2,000-man garrison in Jaffa. Overextended, he had now lost his most important ally and risked facing the wrath of the Ottomans alone. For his part, ?Ali Bey recognized his situation was hopeless. He could only raise a token number of supporters, and these were scattered after a skirmish with the army led by Muhammad Bey. In 1772, ?Ali Bey fled Egypt to take refuge with Zahir in Acre. ‘Ali Bey’s dreams of a neo-Mamluk empire dissolved with his flight from Egypt. Muhammad Bey established himself as the ruler of Egypt and sent Isma’il Bey to Istanbul to secure for him the governorship of both Egypt and Syria. Not for him dreams of empire; Muhammad Bey instead sought recognition within the Ottoman framework. ‘Ali Bey was impatient to reclaim his throne and acted in haste, before he had the chance to mobilize enough of an army to confront the formidable Mamluk household he himself had created. He set off for Cairo in March 1773, at the head of a small force in a hopeless bid to recover his kingdom. Muhammad Bey’s army engaged him in battle and routed ’Ali Bey’s forces. ‘Ali Bey was wounded and taken prisoner. Muhammad Bey took his master back to Cairo and kept him in his own home, where ’Ali Bey died a week later. Inevitably, there were rumors of foul play. “Only God knows the manner of his death,” the chronicler al-Jabarti concluded.²¹ The death of ’Ali Bey proved a disaster for Zahir. He was now a very old man—well into his eighties at a time when life expectancy was half that. He had no allies in the region and had entered into outright treason against his Ottoman sovereign. Improbably, Zahir still sought formal recognition from the authorities and, with the Ottomans mired in their wars with Russia and keen to secure peace in their troubled Syrian provinces, seemed to be on the verge of realizing his lifetime ambition. In 1774 the Ottoman governor of Damascus informed him that he would be appointed governor of Sidon, including northern Palestine and parts of Transjordan. The imperial decree from Istanbul confirming Zahir’s gubernatorial appointment never arrived. In July 1774, the sultan concluded a peace treaty with Russia, bringing the six-year war to an end. He was in no mood to reward traitors who had entered into alliance with his Russian foes. Instead of sending a decree of promotion, the sultan dispatched Muhammad Bey, at the head of a Mamluk army, to overthrow the aged strongman of Palestine. Egyptian troops overran the city of Jaffa in May 1775 and massacred the inhabitants. Panic spread to the other towns under Zahir’s control. Zahir’s administration and much of the population fled Acre by the end of the month. Muhammad Bey occupied Acre in early June. Remarkably, Muhammad Bey, the hale and hearty Mamluk ruler of Egypt, took ill almost as soon as he occupied Acre. He died suddenly of a fever on June 10, 1775. Zahir reclaimed his city days later and restored order after the panic of the Egyptian occupation. But Zahir?s reprieve proved short-lived. The Ottomans sent the admiral of their fleet, Hasan Pasha, with fifteen vessels to demand Zahir?s submission and payment of back taxes. Zahir mounted no opposition. ?I am an old man,? he told his ministers, ?and I don?t have the nerve anymore for fighting.? His battle-weary ministers agreed: ?We are Muslim people, obedient to the Sultan. For the Muslim, believing in One God, it is not permitted to fight against the Sultan in any form.?²² Zahir’s plans for a peaceful retirement were shattered by his own family. He had agreed to withdraw from Acre with his family and retainers and take refuge with his Shi’ite allies in south Lebanon. He was betrayed by his son, ‘Uthman, who suspected his father of feigning a retreat only to return to power at the first opportunity, as he had done time and again. ’Uthman called on one of Zahir’s long-serving officers, a North African commander named Ahmad Agha al-Denizli, and told him that his father was fleeing the city of Acre. “If you wish to be [Admiral] Hasan Pasha’s favourite person, carry out God’s will on my father, for he is outside, alone with his family.” Al-Denizli gathered a group of North African mercenaries and waited to ambush Zahir. The assassins had to lay a trap to catch the elusive old shaykh. Fifteen minutes beyond the gates of Acre, Zahir noticed that one of his concubines was missing. The rest of his household had no idea where she was. “This is no time to leave a person behind,” the old shaykh chided, and rode back to collect the abandoned woman. He found her near the spot where al-Denizli’s band were hiding and reached down to pull her onto his horse. Age and anxiety had taken their toll. Zahir, now eighty-six years old, was pulled from his mount by the younger woman and fell to the ground. The assassins leapt out and struck down the old man with their daggers. Al-Denizli took out his sword and struck off Zahir’s head as a trophy for the Ottoman admiral, Hasan Pasha. If al-Denizli had hoped by this act to gain favor with Hasan Pasha, he was to be sorely disappointed. The Ottoman admiral had his men clean Zahir’s severed head. He then placed it on a chair and meditated on the wizened face of the elderly shaykh. The admiral turned back to the mercenary. “May God not forgive me if I fail to avenge Zahir al-’Umar against you!”²³ He then ordered his men to take al-Denizli away, strangle him, and throw his body into the sea.

So ended the story of Zahir al-‘Umar and ’Ali Bey al-Kabir. The Ottoman Empire had just withstood the most serious internal challenge to its rule after more than 250 years of dominion over the Arab world. Two local leaders, in league with a Christian power, had combined the wealth of two rich territories—Egypt and Palestine—to make common cause against the government of the sultan. Yet even at this critical juncture, when ‘Ali Bey seemed on the verge of reestablishing the ancient Mamluk Empire of Syria, Egypt, and the Hijaz under his personal rule, the Ottomans still exercised tremendous influence over their rebellious subjects in the Arab lands. Mamluk generals like Isma?il Bey and Muhammad Bey crossed the threshold of rebellion only to retrace their footsteps to the limits of legitimacy and seek the Porte?s recognition. Most local leaders still believed that ?rebellion against the Sultan? was, in Isma?il Bey?s words, ?one of the schemes of the Devil.? The fall of Zahir al-‘Umar and ’Ali Bey did not signal the end of local rulers in the Arab world. The Mamluks continued to dominate political life in Egypt, though no single ruler emerged after the deaths of ’Ali Bey and of Muhammad Bey. Instead, the Mamluk households reverted to factional fighting that left Egypt in a state of instability for the remainder of the eighteenth century. The Ottomans reasserted their hold over the Syrian provinces and appointed strong governors to Damascus, Sidon, and Tripoli. More remote places, like Mount Lebanon, Baghdad, and Mosul, continued to be ruled by local leaders, though none attempted to challenge Istanbul’s rule directly.

The next real challenge to Ottoman rule in the Arab world arose beyond the boundaries of the empire, in the heart of Central Arabia. The movement was all the more threatening for its ideological purity, and it would menace Ottoman rule in an arc stretching from Iraq through the Syrian Desert to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz. Unlike Zahir al-‘Umar and ’Ali Bey, the leader of this movement now enjoys the distinction of being a household name in both the Middle East and the West: Muhammad ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi reformist movement.

Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 to a family of scholars in the small oasis town of ’Uyayna in the Central Arabian region known as the Najd. He traveled widely as a young man, pursuing his religious studies in Basra and Medina. He was trained in the most conservative of the four legal traditions of Islam—the Hanbali school—and was profoundly influenced by Ibn Taymiyya, a fourteenth-century theologian. Ibn Taymiyya argued for a return to the practices of the early Muslim community of the Prophet Muhammad and his first successors, or caliphs. He condemned all mystical practices associated with Sufism as deviations from the true path of Islam. Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab returned home to the Najd with a clear set of beliefs and the ambition to put them into practice. At first the passionate young reformer enjoyed the support of the ruler of his home town. However, his views soon proved controversial. When Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ordered the public execution of a woman for adultery, leaders in neighboring towns and key trade partners of ’Uyayna were appalled—and alarmed. This was not Islam as the townspeople of ?Uyayna had known and practiced their faith. They pressured their ruler to kill the radical theologian, but he chose to exile Ibn ?Abd al-Wahhab instead. The exiled young theologian with the dangerous ideas did not have far to wander. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was welcomed by the ruler of the nearby oasis of al-Dir‘iyya, Muhammad ibn Sa’ud. Modern Saudis date the founding of their first state to this historic meeting in 1744–1745, when the two men agreed that the reformed Islam preached by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab would be observed by the Saudi ruler and his followers. The “Dir’iyya Agreement” set out the basic tenets of the movement that would come to be called Wahhabism.

At the time the movement was forming, the Wahhabis were widely misunderstood by the outside world. They were described as a new sect and accused of unorthodox beliefs. Quite the contrary, their beliefs were extremely orthodox, calling for a return to the pristine Islam of the Prophet and his successors, the caliphs. The Wahhabis sought to draw a line around the third century after the revelation of the Qur’an, and to ban all subsequent developments as “pernicious innovation.” The single most important tenet of Wahhabism was the unique quality of God, or, as they put it, the “oneness of God.” Any association of lesser beings with God was denounced as polytheism (in Arabic, shirk), for if one believed God had partners or agents, one believed in more than one God. Islam, like many other religions, is a dynamic faith and has undergone significant changes over time. Over the centuries, a number of institutions had developed in Islam that fell foul of this absolute tenet of Wahhabism, the unity or oneness of God. There was, for instance, a widespread veneration of saints and holy men in the Arab world, from the companions of the Prophet Muhammad to the humblest of local village holy men, each with his own shrine or sacred tree. (These shrines are still maintained in many parts of the Arab world today.) The Wahhabis objected to Muslims praying to holy men to intercede on their behalf with God, as this compromised God’s oneness. They argued that greater reverence was shown to outstanding Muslims by following their example rather than worshiping at their graves. The shrines to saints, and the annual pilgrimages marking a given saint’s day, were thus an early target of Wahhabi attack. Muhammad Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab chopped down sacred trees and shattered the tombs of holy men with his own hands. This horrified mainstream Sunni Muslim society, which saw such desecration of tombs as a mark of disrespect to some of the most revered figures in Islam. Along with his abhorrence of saint worship, Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab was particularly intolerant of the mystical practices and beliefs associated with Sufism. Islamic mysticism takes many forms, from mendicant ascetics to the famous whirling dervishes. Sufis use a wide range of techniques, from fasting to chanting and dancing to self-immolation, to reach the ecstasy of mystical union with the Creator. Organized into orders that convened regular prayer sessions, Sufism was a fundamental part of Ottoman religious and social life. Some orders built fine lodges and attracted the elites of society, and others called for complete abstinence and abandonment of worldly goods. Certain trades and professions were linked to particular Sufi orders. It is hard to think of a religious institution more closely connected to Ottoman society. Yet the Wahhabis believed that all who engaged in Sufism were polytheists for aspiring to mystical union with their Creator. It was a very serious charge. By defining much of Ottoman Islam as polytheistic, the Wahhabis set themselves on a collision course with the empire. Although Orthodox Islam decrees tolerance of other monotheistic faiths, such as Judaism and Christianity, it is absolutely intolerant of polytheism, or the belief in many gods. Indeed, all good Muslims have a duty to persuade polytheists of the error of their ways and convert them to the true path of Islam. Failing that, Muslims have a duty of jihad to fight and eliminate polytheism. By characterizing mainstream practices such as Sufism and the veneration of saints as polytheistic, Wahhabism posed a direct challenge to the religious legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire. The challenge of Wahhabism was easy for the Ottomans to overlook so long as the movement remained confined to the central Arabian region of the Najd, beyond Ottoman frontiers. Between 1744 and the death of Muhammad ibn Sa’ud in 1765, expansion of the Wahhabi movement was limited to the oasis towns of central Najd. It wasn’t until the late 1780s that Wahhabism reached Ottoman frontiers in southern Iraq and the Hijaz. In the 1790s the Ottomans took notice of the new threat to their Arab provinces and urged their governor in Baghdad to take action. The pasha of Baghdad delayed sending his troops into the hostile terrain of the Arabian peninsula for as long as he could. It was not until 1798 that he finally mustered a 10,000-man army to fight the Wahhabis. The Ottoman forces did not fare well in Wahhabi territory; they soon were surrounded and forced to negotiate a truce with Sa‘ud ibn ’Abd al-’Aziz, the Saudi commander. In agreeing to the truce, the Wahhabis made no promises to respect the towns and villages of Ottoman Iraq in the future. The pasha of Baghdad had serious grounds for concern. The Wahhabis pursued their crusade into Ottoman territory for the first time in 1802, when they attacked the southern Iraqi shrine city of Karbala. Karbala holds a special position in Shiite Islam, for it was here that Husayn ibn ’Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, was killed by the forces of the Umayyad caliph in 680 AD. The martyred Husayn is venerated as the third of twelve infallible leaders, or imams, of Shi’ite Islam, and the mosque built on the site of his tomb was lavishly decorated with a gilt dome. Thousands of pilgrims would come each year to lay precious gifts on the tomb of the imam and undertake acts of devotion in his honour?just the sort of saint veneration that the Wahhabis found most abhorrent. The Wahhabi attack on Karbala was chillingly brutal. The chronicler Ibn Bishr gives a contemporary description of the carnage:The Muslims [i.e., Wahhabis] surrounded Karbala and took it by storm. They killed most of the people in the markets and houses. They destroyed the dome above Husayn’s grave. They took away everything they saw in the mausoleum and near it, including the coverlet decorated with emeralds, sapphires and pearls which covered the grave. They took away everything they found in the town—possessions, arms, clothes, fabric, gold, silver and precious books. One cannot count their spoils. They stayed there for just one morning and left after midday, taking away all the possessions. Nearly 2,000 people were killed in Karbala.²⁴

The slaughter, the desecration of Husayn’s tomb and mosque, and the plundering of the town established the Wahhabis’ violent reputation in Arab public opinion. The brutality of the attack and the killing of so many unarmed men, women, and children in a place of worship provoked widespread revulsion across the Ottoman world. The residents of towns and villages in southern Iraq, eastern Syria, and the Hijaz turned to the Ottoman government to shield them from this grave threat. The Ottomans faced great difficulty in confronting the Wahhabi challenge. The reform movement was based in Central Arabia, beyond some of the most remote Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman troops had to march for months from Anatolia to reach the borderlands of the Najd. As the governor of Baghdad had already discovered, it was very difficult to fight the Wahhabis on their own terrain. Just keeping large armies supplied with food and water proved a tremendous challenge for the Ottomans in such a hostile environment. The Ottoman government found itself powerless to contain the Wahhabi menace. The Wahhabis next struck at the very heart of Ottoman legitimacy by attacking the holy cities of Islam—Mecca and Medina. In March 1803, the Saudi commander Sa‘ud ibn ’Abd al-’Aziz advanced on the Hijaz; by April, he entered the city of Mecca. His army met no resistance and promised no violence. They first explained their beliefs to the residents of Mecca and then imposed their new laws: silk clothes and smoking were banned, shrines were destroyed, domes on buildings were knocked down. After holding the holy cities for a number of months, the Wahhabis withdrew to the Najd. It was not until 1806 that the Wahhabis decided to strip the Hijaz from Ottoman domains and annex the province to their rapidly expanding state. Once the Wahhabis were in control of Mecca and Medina, pilgrims from the Ottoman Empire were no longer admitted to Islam’s holy cities to perform their religious duty of pilgrimage. Both of the official Ottoman pilgrimage caravans, from Damascus and Cairo, were accompanied by a mahmal, a richly decorated litter carried by a camel. The mahmal contained a cover for the shrine holding the holy black stone known as the Ka‘ba, at the center of the mosque in Mecca, as well as copies of the Qur’an and rich treasures. The mahmal was surrounded by musicians playing drums and blaring horns. The use of music, the decoration of the Ka’ba shrine, and the association of opulence with worship all offended Wahhabi strictures, and they refused to admit the mahmal to Mecca, breaking with centuries of Sunni Muslim veneration for Mecca’s holiest shrine. One of the officers accompanying the Egyptian caravan in 1806 related his experiences with the Wahhabis to the chronicler al-Jabarti:Pointing to the mahmal, the Wahhabi had asked him: “What are these gifts of yours that you bring and hold in such veneration among yourselves?” He had answered: “It is a custom which has been observed from ancient times. It is an emblem and a signal for the pilgrims to gather.” The Wahhabi said: “Do not do so, and do not bring it after this time. If you ever bring it again, I shall smash it.”²⁵

In 1807 a Syrian caravan without the mahmal and musicians sought entry to Mecca and was nevertheless denied. With or without the mahmal, the Wahhabis believed Ottoman Muslims to be no better than polytheists and denied them entry to Islam’s holiest places. The most important of the sultan’s imperial titles emphasized his role as the defender of the faith and protector of the holy cities of the Hijaz. The Wahhabis’ annexation of the Hijaz and ban on the Ottoman pilgrimage caravans defied the temporal powers of the Ottoman state in securing its territories as well as the sultan’s religious legitimacy as the guardian of Islam’s holiest cities. The gravity of this threat could not be more severe. The Ottomans would not survive if they failed to respond to this challenge and reassert their authority.