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Egoist is like one sitting for long in a well
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Egoist is like one sitting for long in a well[1]

Global sociology as it is seen from the heights of the US «high» political analytics: on Z. Brzezinski’s book «The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives». (Russian edition – M. International Relations.1998. Original edition Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives».Basic Books.)

There is a legend coming from the antiques times of Greek-Persian wars. The numerous armies and fleet of Persia which by that time already conquered many peoples and established its presence on the Mediterranean Sea, were overhanging the Hellenistic Civilization, the latter, at the first sight, being much less powerful and controlled less «human» and material resources than its potential conqueror. The war began and one sage suggested showing to the Greek warriors their future enemies as they really were.

A group of captured Persians appeared naked in the field where the battle-ranks were drawn up. It is known, even from antique sculpture, that the Greeks of those times paid special attention to body-building exercises to prepare themselves for military service. When this people who were used to purposeful physical training from their childhood saw the Persians naked they almost fell with laugh as they could not imagine that such feeble men even though grouped in numerous armies would be a dangerous enemy on the battle-field. The ensuing military actions brought decisive victory of Greeks over feeble ones who at that time pretended to establish the unrivalled world primacy of their state and subsequently, to shape the outlook of the whole world.

Now, we suggest dwelling on the main subject of the present note. The author of the book is the former National Security Adviser of the American President in 1977-1981, consultant of the Center for Strategic and International Studies[2], professor of foreign affairs in Paul H. Nitze School of Contemporary International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C. (as given in the Abstract).The following dedication precedes the book: «For my students-to help them shape tomorrow’s world».

As one may conclude from the above, Z. Brzezinski has, in essence, formulated his parting wishes to those future successors who are expected to occupy positions in the American state establishment only after a period of time to come.

Russian reader as well is not left without «parting wishes», since there is a foreword by Y.G. Kobaladze, Major-General of the EIS (External Intelligence Service).Yuri Kobaladze was reported («Pravda», 21.12.96) to hold the post (at least during this period) of EIS press-bureau chief. «In one of his interviews he was explicit in saying that he did not believe in any conspiracies, judo-mason centres, or agents of influence». He is claiming that «the Soviet Union had been pulled down not by the CIA. We did it ourselves»[3] (ibid.) So, Y.G. Kobaladze’s assessment of Z. Brzezinski’s book should be taken too in this context.

Y.G. Kobaladze goes along:

«This is a useful book for all who deal with the foreign policy or devote their passion or interest to this subject. Because still no one has told us about America as the «only superpower» using so simple, rigid and frankly words and still no one has disclosed in such a revealing way, how its exceptional position is to be preserved and consolidated.<…>

Perhaps, one may be shocked by how the question is put about US policy with respect to Russia: «What kind of Russia is in America’s interest, and what and how much can America do about it»? To answer this question the author devotes a special chapter. He refers to «the black hole».And this is strange, strictly speaking, and inconsistent with the foregoing. In fact, «the black hole «in astrophysics means a certain body which absorbs irreversibly the surrounding substance. Russia, in contrast, is loosing parts of its «body».Meanwhile Z. Brzezinski, speaking about Russia in his book, formulates the twofold problem of the American policy: how to encourage Russia’s democratic transformation and economic recovery while «avoiding the re-emergence of a Eurasian empire that could obstruct the American geostrategic goal of shaping a larger Euro-Atlantic system to which Russia can then be stably and safely related».

At the end of his foreword Y.G. Kobaladze says:

«It‘s evident, multipolar world concepts are alien to Brzezinski because of his very nature. And it is all the more interesting that the final part of his book is named: «Beyond the Last Global Superpower».Yes, the author admits that the USA are the first and the last global superpower, also that the time will come when «global politics are bound to become increasingly uncongenial to the concentration of hegemonic power in the hands of a single state». And what if this time is coming already?

The end of the «Cold War» has significantly complicated America’s status of «free world’s» leader.

This book, written by Z. Brzezinski – one of the forgers of American foreign policy – is a search for a new strategy of American world’s primacy. Elephant in a store is trying to break as less plates as possible».

Is Russia a «black hole», as its role is defined by Z. Brzezinski, or Y.G. Kobaladze, surprised by such assessment from the overseas, was right? – This question, when elucidated, will allow answering another question tackled by both Z. Brzezinski and Y.G. Kobaladze: «What will be beyond the last global superpower»? Or more precisely: «Will it be the American global policy that will shape the future world’s framework «beyond the last global superpower» or it will be the future world’s framework that will make impossible for America to further exist in its present shape framed historically?

To answer these questions, no matter whatever irritation the views expressed by Z. Brzezinski in his book may provoke, one should reject, at first, that dependant-hypocritical standpoint which has been selected by the external intelligence Major-General, demoralized by the Cold War. His words: «no one has told us about America as the «only superpower» using so simple, rigid and frankly words and still no one has disclosed in such a revealing way, how its exceptional position is to be preserved and consolidated»-is a testimony of either his full professional inconsistency or his open hypocrisy.

Given his professional position, he ought to know about the content of many papers where the attitudes of American rulers and their advisers towards the USSR and Russia were clearly stated. In particular, the USA NSC-20/1 Directive of August 18, 1948 was clearly entitled: «Our goals with respect to Russia». Compared with Z. Brzezinski’s book, it sounds even more open because its target was not good-will idealists of student youth kind, those who have never been familiar with real political practice, but ready American state leaders who have been scrupulously screened both in public politics and within the system of inter-nazi mason lodges – this internal frame of democratic – but in Western manner-state structure, although this fact permanently falls in oblivion.

Extracts from this Directive are quoted below as cited in N.N. Yakovlev’s[4] book “The CIA against the USSR” (Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, p.p. 38-40, as selected):

«Our main goals with respect to Russia are essentially twofold:

a) To minimize Moscow's might;

b) To introduce fundamental changes in the theory and practices of the foreign policy pursued by the government in power in Russia

... We are not committed to any time limit to achieve our goals in peaceful time.

...We have grounds decisively not to feel any guilty when striving for ruling out of concepts incompatible with international peace and stability and for their replacement with concepts of tolerance and international cooperation. It is not our concern to think about internal consequences that such concepts, if adopted, would entail in other country; equally, we should not think that we bear any responsibility for these events (we use italics when citing: the United States are guilty since they refused to take care and responsibility)... If the Soviet leaders assume that the increasing significance of more enlightened concepts in international relations is incompatible with the preservation of their power in Russia it will be their concern, not our. Our concern is to work and ensure that internal events occur there...As government we are not responsible for internal conditions in Russia...

...Our purpose in the name of peace is not the overthrow of the Soviet government. Of course, we are aspiring to create such circumstances and situation, which the present Soviet leaders will not tolerate and which will not be to their liking. Perhaps, when facing such a situation, they will not be able to preserve their power in Russia. But it should be stressed with full authority-it is their concern, not our...

...It is a matter of priority to make and keep the Soviet Union weak – politically, militarily and psychologically – vis-à-vis the external forces which are out of its control.

...We should not hope to fully impose our will on the Russian territory, as we have tried to do in Germany and Japan. We must understand that the final resolution should be political.

...If the worst occurs, namely, the Soviet power will be preserved on the whole or almost whole present Soviet territory, we must require:

a) fulfilment of pure military conditions (surrender of weapons, evacuation of key regions etc.) in order to ensure long-term military disability;

b) fulfilment of conditions aiming to ensure significant economic dependence on the external world.

…In other words, we must create automatic guarantees to ensure that even non-communist regime, nominally friendly to us:

a) does not possess of significant military might;

b) remains largely dependant on the external world in economic respect;

c) does not exercise serious control over main national minorities;

d) does not establish anything that would resemble the iron curtain.

In case such a regime will prove to be hostile to communists and friendly to us, we must take care that these terms be imposed in neither insulting nor humiliating way. But we must impose them by any means to protect our interests».

And this is not just an episode, a kind of "extraction" from general statistics of facts characterizing American foreign policy. The NSC-68 Directive of 30.09.1950 (ibid, pp. 64, 65) envisions:

«... to sow the seeds of destruction inside the Soviet system in order to make Kremlin at least to change its policy … But without superior military might, available and easily mobilized, the policy of “deterrence” which essentially is the policy of calculated and gradual compulsion, is no more than a bluff».

The own policy is tacitly presumed to be irreproachable.

«...We must conduct an open psychological war to provoke mass treachery with respect to Soviets and to ruin other Kremlin plans. To strengthen positive and relevant steps and actions by secret means in the field of economic and psychological war in order to provoke and support riots and rebellions in selected and strategically important satellite-states.

...Besides the affirmation of our values, our policy and our actions must be such as to cause fundamental changes in the very nature of the Soviet system, and the failure of Kremlin's plans is the first important step to achieve these changes. It is absolutely evident that if these changes are resulting from the activities of internal forces of the Soviet society this will cost less while being more efficient…

Victory, for sure, will be secured by the failure of Kremlin's plans as a result of gradual increase of free world ability and its implantation in the Soviet world in such a way as to cause internal changes of the Soviet system».[5]

As reported by N.N. Yakovlev (so much unloved by many democratizers-Sakharov followers) the total edition of the book «The CIA against the USSR» and of extracts from it accounted by 1991 to 20 million. For this very reason, the analysts of Soviet and Russian secret services could be unaware of its contents and unable to react adequately only if there was a persistent will not to be aware. This persistence may be explained either by direct treachery[6] or by conviction, – as Y.G. Kobaladze puts it in one of his interviews,-that he did not believe in any conspiracies or «judo-mason» centres, agents of influence etc.

Well, so he does not believe, come what may, and even life realities are nothing for him; therefore he is claiming that «the Soviet Union had been pulled down not by the CIA. We did it ourselves.» As for how «we did it ourselves» in full conformity with the overseas directives aimed to destroy the USSR in the time of peace – the analysis of this problem is far from being priority matter for our native state analysts, though all good-will policy-makers and businessmen should know why the cited overseas directives regarding Russia have not turned to become useless as the proverb provides: «Dog is baying, wind is taking».

But in historical context, the above cited US NSC Directives as well as many other papers still unpublished were preceded also by the notorious «Protocols of the Zion Sages» – truly false document by virtue of its origin, insofar as its primary purpose was– by revealing the fact of its forgery – to create prejudice with regard to real programme, formulated there in general, the programme of management of the XX century global civilization. As one may remember, the overthrow of great empires of Eurasia, including the Russian Empire-and this had been done in the course of the First World War of the XX century, was treated as a special subject in the materials of this diversionary operation which was arranged irreproachably, by the way, in psychological terms (given the prevailing social attitudes of those times).

Those who considered the programmes, as formulated in the «Protocols», to be authentic, were said to be «crazy» by others who were not believing in any global conspiracies and agents of influence and thus were inactive, doing nothing to prevent that the doctrine, as formulated in the «Protocols», comes true. Hence, the «Protocols» worked. The result is well known.

Z. Brzezinski’s book is not something outstanding even from the position of how goals and means with respect to Russia and some other countries are exposed in it: it is just one of many overseas voluptuary desires and directives where these desires are spelt.

On the other hand, when – as at the times of J.V. Stalin (Koba)[7] – the leadership of the Russian statehood-civilization is convinced that other states and non-governmental international circles are trying to achieve their goals on the territory of Russia and inside its society– thus entailing conspiracies supported by local agents of influence– the course of events proves to be quite different. In the same US NSC Directive-20/1 of August 18, 1948 we find the following words to specify the period between 1933 and 1948, when this very approach was prevailing in the USSR with respect to internal and foreign policies: «We have withstood too much during the last 15 years...» But if the analysis in the spirit of Koba and the politics based on it are replaced by Kobaladze’s approach, then it is our turn to withstand. Therefore the time has come to put an end to such analysis and such ensuing policies in order not to have to withstand furthermore the stupidity and the villainy.

Meanwhile, as long as global-range political and sociological analysis underlying state-policy in Russia is based on tradition : «I believe or not, and thus I don’t want to know» – and this is the case of Y.G. Kobaladze and of many others– nothing inside Russia itself can generally prevent that all kinds of directives – originating from the overseas and manifesting the goals of their rulers with regard to Russia, all of us and of our descendants included, – come true, no matter whether these directives are spoken out or not.

In case this situation in Russia persists, the country may be protected against such overseas directives only if the directive-makers commit mistakes that would make these directives unviable or bring results opposite to expected.

A question may arise: «How does the legend’s plot, by which we begin the present analytical note, correlate with all this and, in particular, with Z. Brzezinski’s book»? The fact is that if not all of Russia then its overwhelming majority is used to view Z. Brzezinski as one of the most powerful political analysts of the world whose role in the ending of the Cold War by American victory and by collapse of the USSR as a state was far from being minor.[8] At the same time, however, the majority is not familiar with what constitutes the substance of views advocated by Z. Brzezinski but just admires his authority boosted by mass-media. Meanwhile, the publication of his book in our country has changed the situation in core: the opportunity has emerged for the Russian reader to observe, – naked as they are, – the morals of Z. Brzezinski, – essentially, a typical representative of the American political «elite» – and his corresponding world outlook and intellectual culture. Thus, the way has been opened to see and touch «the intellectual muscles» of one of the «strategists-winners» in the Cold War. What we have seen could not but evoke in our memory the legend that had reached us from the far antique ages, this legend reciting about the failure of the ancient – Persian claims for world primacy and for the right to shape the future world.

Z. Brzezinski writes:

“The ultimate objective of American policy should be benign and visionary: to shape a truly cooperative global community, in keeping with long-range trends and with the fundamental interests of humankind. But in the meantime, it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America. The formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of this book” (italicized by Z. Brzezinski) («The Grand Chessboard», p.12, dated: April 1997).

This last paragraph in the book’s «Introduction» provides all necessary grounds to conclude that America is under great menace and that it is unlikely to avoid calamities just by its own if its present and future policy-makers continue to trust so senselessly to such authoritative analysts and university professors as Z. Brzezinski, because their works do not contain ideas that, if they come true, would guarantee the security of American development. As said by the Apostle James: «he is a double-minded man, unsteady in all his ways» (The General Epistle, 1:8). The same is applicable to societies and states. In order to make sure that the remark made by the Apostle James is quite fair with respect to the present American political establishment, we need to consider in details what is written by Z. Brzezinski.

We shall start with analysing the meaning of the first phrase cited. First, the «ultimate objective» of the policy of any state, in order to be pursued, should be recognized in this state as an objective of paramount significance and, in essence, should be truly benign and visionary to keep with the fundamental interests of humankind. Here Z. Brzezinski is absolutely right.

All other objectives in global, foreign and internal policies of state should be subordinated to this «ultimate objective» of the highest priority of significance. As for conformity of the policy to the «long-range trends»,it must be said that some trends out of the full spectrum run counter the interests of humankind; others conform them absolutely and in all times, but there are also trends that either conform the long-range interests of humankind or contradict them, depending on prevailing historical circumstances. It follows that it was Z. Brzezinski’s mistake to refer to indefinite «long-range trends» in general when speaking about visionary objectives (see the first phrase cited above), because the visionary (ultimate) objectives-mean one thing, while «long-range trends» in general and not defined in essence – mean another thing, this last not always being positive for the former.

The case is not better, if we take the second phrase. It tacitly implies that America is irreproachable, – if not as a historical entity, standing firmly by the present time, then at least in the sense of supremacy therein of steady trends in social and personal development insofar as the «fundamental interests of humankind», mentioned in the first phrase, are expressed by these trends. If this is really so, then it is meaningful to support the “blameless” line of American global policy as dominating globally, so that the bearers of other trends which contradict the «fundamental interests of humankind», whether in Eurasia, South America, Africa or elsewhere, do not strengthen their positions to be able to hinder the progress of the whole humankind under American leadership.

But if America is not irreproachable, mainly in the sense of supremacy therein of steady trends of social development, then the meaning of the second phrase of the cited paragraph is evidently incompatible with the meaning of the former phrase on the highest priority of «fundamental interests of humankind» in the American policy. If another society, beyond the US government jurisdiction, turns to be free of trends which run counter the «fundamental interests of humankind» but which are inherent to present America, then, as the general and indefinite meaning of the second phrase implies, the interests of the whole humankind are to be suppressed by American primacy – which is far from being irreproachable – over Eurasia and other regions of the planet.

Having said this, we are not slandering Z. Brzezinski insofar as his book in general does not contain answers to interconnected questions such as:

What the fundamental interests of humankind are?

How in particular the historical entity as it stands and the trends of social development, inherent to America, prevent the exercise of fundamental interests of the humankind?

The same set of questions is relevant with regard to any society in any state; meanwhile the way they are answered enables to define all capacities for cooperation in the cause of exercise of fundamental interests of humankind in everyday life of societies and in the foreign policy of states; all other sorts of cooperation do not represent any interest to humankind.

Without answering these questions in essence, the formulation of a comprehensive and integrated global political strategy (and not Eurasian geostrategy, as Z. Brzezinski envisages in the third phrase) is impossible.

In addition, as follows from the cited paragraph and the remaining text of the book, Z. Brzezinski does not realize the evident difference between terms and corresponding life phenomena, such as global policy in general and state global policy, state foreign policy, state internal policy. But if, however, he does realize the difference between them – then not only he is one of the USSR grave-diggers but he is condemned to be included in the aftermath in the list of anti-American agents of influence and gravediggers of the USA as a presently standing historical entity.

Meanwhile the difference between all mentioned kinds of policy does exist:

global policy – is the activity aimed to implement objectives with respect to the wholehumankind and to the planet of Earth. In its core, this is mostly the management of a spectrum of long-range trends, what in many cases excludes the conformity of current policy to the trends which already exist. When formulating this policy, the Earth, of course, may be regarded as «the Grand Chessboard» but this «board», then, is to be used to dislocate all countries, including your own; and the player should involve every country[9], moreover – in such a way as to avoid that anyone looses, except those who will have desire to loose. The fact that Z. Brzezinski has stressed the necessity to «keep with long-range trends» while the «chessboard», according to him, is only Eurasia, means that his worldview is not adequate for global policy-making and for being political adviser in this field, though he has committed himself to this cause. The same is true for those who resort to his advises;

foreign policy-is the activity aimed to implement objectives of the state ruling class beyond the limits of its territory and its jurisdiction. Z. Brzezinski has been successful in this kind of advisory for the simple reason that his customers themselves have a slightest idea about global policy making, which, in essence, can not be associated anyway with neither cruises on the board of the aircraft carriers-as may be derived from what has been said, – nor with the introduction of dollar as a circulating currency, nor with wide-scale demonstration of «Basic instinct»[10] in all parts of the planet;

internal policy – is the activity aimed to implement the objectives of the state ruling class on its territory within the limits of its jurisdiction.

The ruling classes of the majority of state entities in history are not homogeneous and, by virtue of this, their different subgroups may have different interests and distribute differently their efforts within the framework of their global, foreign and internal policies. For this reason the global, foreign and internal policies of the same state may distinguish, more or less, and even suppress each other. How this may happen in practice, high politological considerations left aside, one may read in the novel by Polish writer Boleslav Prus – «Pharaoh», which has been published several times in Russia since 1991.

But the World is such that the comprehensive processes define the course of those that exist inside them, and, by virtue of this, the global policy, as it stands objectively, no matter whether adequately it is understood by political analysts or not, defines the results of internal and foreign policy of any state.

Thus, for instance, when the hierarchy of Ancient Egypt started to make global policy vesting all its covets in the long-range Biblical project[11] which was aimed to build up a global uniform civilization based on racial financial primacy of the «elite» of Judah-money-lenders, the Egypt of those who were not involved in that project, collapsed because its foreign and internal policy could not resist that global policy, while its own global policy had not been formulated; after Egypt the process of collapse embraced other cultures where the Biblical project was adopted for implementation. The opposite example is the fast emergence and spreading of Koranic civilization and undisputable successes of its cultural development in the Middle Ages, although its origins were confined to Arabia, primitive country if compared with the Egypt of pharaohs.

Y.G. Kobaladze, much like Z. Brzezinski, does not realize the evident difference between global, foreign and internal policy of states. But Z. Brzezinski, engaged in American foreign policy making, still possesses – as distinguished from Y.G. Kobaladze – of a certain feeling of global policy strategies emanating from different regions of the planet. This very difference between the above political analysts is manifested in the fact that Z. Brzezinski called his book’s chapter devoted to Russia – «The Black Hole» while Y.G. Kobaladze was taken surprised by this because the «black hole» is a body which is absorbing irreversibly the surrounding substance. Russia, in contrast, is loosing parts of its «body».

This comment by Y.G. Kobaladze is of the sort – “I am singing what I am seeing (right now)” but I do not know and do not remember anything preceding this and therefore I do not assume any responsibility for consequences. Z. Brzezinski, as distinguished from Y.G. Kobaladze, remembers a lot of what preceded the present situation of Russia, and that is why the chapter devoted to it is called «The Black Hole»; Rus, Russia – which is a regional civilization of many peoples within the limits of one state – was absorbing the adjacent territories, and the peoples who inhabited them were making their own contribution to the culture which was shared by all. This process was not monotone but fluctuating, its fluctuation amplitude increasing with every cycle «compression of the borders of Russia → MEANINGFUL change in the quality of Russian culture → expansion of the borders of Russia (state-civilization) beyond the limits set up by the previous phase of compression of the borders».

This circumstance, insofar as it may concern any political analysis with respect to Russia, inside or outside it, and in any historical era, necessitates the identification and revision of «ultimate objectives» and of means used to implement them. But these problems are passed over in complete silence by Z. Brzezinski, though everyone should understand that no «Eurasian geostrategy» can be formulated in America unless the objectives and the corresponding means of those, whom in respect to this strategy is formulated, become clear.

Though Z. Brzezinski does not refer directly to historical cycles of Russia’s civilization, he does show a certain feeling enabling him to distinct the character of Russia’s historical development from other countries; this is because he uses sometimes the term «nation-state»with respect to the countries of the West. This term reflects the principle of mutually synonymous conformity of the «title nation» (people) to its inherent statehood, which constitutes, first, a system of professional management of society, and second, a territory where the title nation lives together with the ethnically alien national minorities. With respect to Russia he does not apply this term.

Although Z. Brzezinski refers once to Huntington who directly pointed out to the West that Russia is not a state in the western sense but itself represents one of many civilizations of the planet, this subject has not been elucidated in his book, so the Western reader is kept away from the substance of problems faced by American policy in Eurasia.


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