Текст книги "Inferno: The Devastation of Hamburg, 1943"

Автор книги: Keith Lowe

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9 Volker Böge and Jutta Deide-Lüchow, Eimsbüttler Jugend im Krieg(Hamburg, 2000), p. 21; Ludwig Faupel’s diary, FZH 292–8, A–F.

10 See ‘Frau W.’ in Monika Sigmund et al. (eds), ‘ Man versuchte längs zu kommen, und man lebt ja noch…’ (Hamburg, 1996), p. 29.

11 Hamburg Police Report, p. 1, UK National Archives AIR 20/7287; Hans Brunswig, Feuersturm über Hamburg(Stuttgart, 2003), p. 187.

12 Wanda Chantler (née Wanziunia Cieniewska-Radziwill), interview with the author, 5 July 2004.

13 Hannah Kelson interview, IWM Sound Archive 15550/5. Tonight, fortunately for her, she was on holiday in a village just outside Hamburg, so missed the full force of the raid, although the noise and commotion were still enough to rouse her from her bed.

14 Martha Bührick, quoted in Renate Hauschild-Thiessen, Unternehmen Gomorrha(Hamburg, 1993), p. 25.

15 See, for example, Hanni Paulsen’s description of a bunker, in Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), pp. 149–50.

16 Hans Erich Nossack, Der Untergang(Hamburg, 1981), p. 17.

17 Ibid., p. 19.

18 Ibid., p. 13.

19 Broadcast according to Georg Ahrens’s nephew, Hans Ahrens, quoted in Renate Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe vom Sommer 1943 in Augenzeugenberichten(Hamburg, 1993), p. 18.

20 Interview with Frau M., St Pauli Archiv, 26 February 1993.

21 Letter to the Hamburger Abendblatt, 1 August 2003.

22 Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner (London, 1948), pp. 215 and 224.

23 Rudolf Schurig, quoted in Rudolf Wolter, Erinnerung an Gomorrha(Hamburg, 2003), p. 122.

24 Ibid., p. 122.

25 Johann Ingw. Johannsen, typescript account, c/o Marga Ramcke, Ottensen Geschichtswerkstatt.

26 Hiltgunt Zassenhaus, ‘Feuer vom Himmel’, in Hage (ed.), Hamburg 1943(Frankfurt am Main, 2003), pp. 156–7.

27 Henni Klank, ‘Operation Gomorrha’, http://www.seniorennethamburg.de/zeitzeugen/vergessen/klank1.htm (last viewed 1 September 2005).

28 Hiltgunt Zassenhaus, in Hage, Hamburg 1943, p. 157.

29 Ibid.

30 Paul Elingshausen, typescript account, FZH 292–8, A–F.

31 Wanda Chantler interview.

32 ‘Klöntreff “Eimsbüttel im Feuersturm”’, unpublished transcript of local-history group conversation, Galerie Morgenland/Geschichtwerkstatt, p. 4.

33 Liselotte Gerke, interview with the author, 6 April 2005.

34 Hamburg Police Report, p. 15, UK National Archives, AIR 20/7287. Later estimates put the death toll for this raid much higher, but it is almost impossible to say with any accuracy how many people died in any one particular raid during this intense period of attack.

35 Brunswig, Feuersturm, pp. 162, 167 and 175.

36 Erwin Garvens, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 33.

37 Paul Elingshausen, FZH 292–8, A–F.

38 Hamburg Police Report, p. 15.

39 Ibid.

40 See Wolten, Erinnerung, p. 125.

41 History of Luftgaukommando XI by General Flieger Wolff, Bundes archiv, RL 19/424. See Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), pp. 154 and 168.

42 The single Wellington shot down belonged to 166 Squadron. See W. R. Chorley (ed.), Bomber Command Losses, vol. 4 (1943), (Hersham, 2004), p. 239.

43 Johannsen account.

44 Ibid.

45 Rolf Arnold, http://www.seniorennet-hamburg.de/zeitzeugen/vergessen/arnold1.php (last viewed 1 September 2005).

46 Wolff-Möncheberg, On the Other Side, pp.68–9.

47 Johannsen account.

48 Liselotte Gerke interview.

49 Franz Termer, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 47.

50 Pastor Schoene, of the Christuskirche in Eimsbüttel, quoted in Volker Böge and Jutta Deide-Lüchow, Eimsbüttler Jugend im Krieg(Hamburg, 1992), p. 24.

51 Total Damage Report, UK National Archives, AIR 40/426.

52 Reconnaissance report on photographs taken by RAF 542 Squadron, at 1200 hours, 27 July 1943, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257; see also Franz Termer, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 47.

53 Ilse Grassmann, Ausgebombt, p. 20.

54 Wolff-Mönckeberg, On the Other Side, p. 69.

55 Ibid.

56 Total Damage Report, UK National Archives, AIR 40/426.

57 Wanda Chantler interview.

58 See Hamburger Zeitung, 25 July 1943: ‘Das Verlassen des Lufschutzortes Hamburg ist bis auf weiteres nur mit einer besonderen Genehmigung gestattet.’

59 Wolff-Mönckeberg, On the Other Side, pp. 69–70.

11    The Americans Join the Fray

1 Speech at Columbus, Ohio, 11 August 1880, in the Ohio State Journal, 12 August 1880; a photostat of the published speech can be found in Lloyd Lewis, Sherman, Fighting Prophet(New York, 1932), p. 637.

2 In March 1944, faced with high losses among his men, he was quoted as saying that he would like to bomb ‘those damn cities’ until ‘there won’t be a damn house left’. See Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgement:American Bombing in World War II(New York, 1985), p. 68.

3 Anderson flew with Flight-Lieutenant Garvey of 83 Squadron; see UK National Archives, AIR 27/687.

4 The Casablanca conference in January had designated U-boat manufacturers as the highest-priority target, but by the time of the Pointblank Directive in June this had taken second place to German air-force targets, such as Klöckner, which were ‘second to none in immediate importance’. See W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. II (Chicago, 1949), p. 666.

5 Group leader’s report on mission, 25 June 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 728, Folder 2. See also Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth(London, 1986), p. 52.

6 For details of this meteorological flight, see UK National Archives, AIR 29/867.

7 For all these plans, see VIII Bomber Command Report of Operations; and 1st Bombardment Wing Report of Operations, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 941. See also Martin Middle-brook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), pp. 176–80; and Gordon Musgrove, Operation Gomorrah(London, 1981), p. 56.

8 351st BG had arrived in Britain at the end of April and had flown its first mission in mid-May on Courtai (14 May); 379th BG had arrived around the same time (first mission, St Nazaire, 29 May); 381st BG and 384th BG had both arrived in May/June (first mission, Antwerp, 22 June). See Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Diary(London and New York, 1981).

9 I had the great pleasure of working with Pierre Clostermann on the English translation of the millennium edition of his classic book The Big Show. This was one of his favourite anecdotes about the Americans he met during the war.

10 Walter K. Davis, interview with the author, 28 July 2005.

11 John F. Homan interview, 25 July 2002, Tape 3, side A, Oral History Archives of World War II, Rutgers University.

12 Samuel P. Fleming, Flying with the Hell’s Angels(Spartanburg, 1992), pp. 49–50. In July 1943 the combat tour was still twenty-five missions.

13 Joseph E. Mutz interview, 9 February 2000, Tape 1, Side A, Reichelt Oral History Program, Florida State University. Mutz flew as armourer/gunner for the 95th BG in the Warnemünde wing on 25 July 1943.

14 The US Army was, of course, already engaged in Sicily and North Africa, but with nothing like the numbers that would be deployed the following year.

15 W. Scott Buist interview, 27 September 1995, Tape 1, Side A, New Brunswick History Department, Oral History Archives of World War II, Rutgers University.

12    The Luftwaffe Strikes Back

1 This is the popular form of the quotation. The actual quotation is ‘No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force.’ See ‘Über Strategie’ in Helmuth von Moltke, Moltkes Militärische Werke, vol. II (Berlin, 1900), p. 291.

2 Philip P. Dreiseszun, 381st BG website, http://www.381st.org/stories–dreiseszun.html (last viewed 5 April 2006).

3 Ironically, the Klöckner factory had already evacuated before these raids took place, so it was a much less important target than the USAAF thought. The plant had become a repair shop, with some continued production of gears and screws. See USSBS, Economic Effects of the Air Offensive against German Cities: A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Hamburg, Germany(November 1945) p. 45, UK National Archives, AIR 48/19.

4 Quote and estimate of AA guns from 303rd BG ‘Mission to Hamburg, Germany: Estimate’, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 678, Folder 9. Martin Middlebrook lists the numbers of heavy flak guns in the city as 88mm, 166, 105mm, 96, and 128mm, 16 guns although he does not reveal his source for this information; see The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), p. 84. His numbers are backed up by the website http://www.lostplaces.de/flakhamburg (last viewed 1 December 2004), which says that in addition twenty 128mm guns and forty-eight 105mm guns were brought in on seventeen railway flak batteries.

5 Howard L. Cromwell, quoted in Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, p. 183.

6 Philip P. Dreiseszun, 381st BG website.

7 Edward Piech interview, c/o Shaun Illingworth, Oral History Archive of World War II, Rutgers University. Piech flew on the second Hamburg mission the following day, but his comments are relevant to both missions.

8 Sometimes it took even longer. For example, the 91st BG took off at 1320 but did not finally cross the English coast until 1437. See 91st BG immediate narrative, 26 July 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 541, Folder 11.

9 Donald Hillenmayer interview, Oral History Archives of World War II, 11 September 2003, Tape 1, Side B, Rutgers University.

10 See Philip Dreiseszun, 381st BG website.

11 Albert S. Porter Jr interview, 9 February 2004, Tape 2, Side A, Oral History Archives of World War II, Rutgers University.

12 Edward Piech interview.

13 Lieutenant Darrell Gust, quoted in Brian D. O’Neill, 303rd Bombardment Group(Oxford, 2003), pp. 61–2.

14 See Donald L Caldwell, The JG26 War Diary, vol. II (London, 1998), p. 121.

15 Ibid.

16 Walter K. Davis, interview with the author 28 July 2005.

17 Ibid.

18 381st BG War Diary, 25 July 1943. See 381st BG website.

19 Charles R. Bigler, quoted in Frank L. Betz and Kenneth H. Cassens (eds), 379th BG Anthology(Paducah, 2000), p. 17. Bigler mentions this as happening on the Sunday raid, but it appears these events took place on the Saturday; see Derwyn D. Robb, Shades of Kimbolton: A Narrative of 379th Bombardment Group(San Angelo, 1981), 25 July 1943.

20 Major Kirk Mitchell, quoted in message from 303rd BG to 1st Bombardment Wing, 25 July 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 678, Folder 9. For Mitchell’s more realistic estimate, see US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 406, Folder 9.

21 Staff Sergeant F. C. Thurman, quoted in PRO Report, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1081, Folder 8. As the lead group, the 379th BG was supposed to drop its bombs first, but it was not uncommon for whole squadrons or groups to drop their bombs slightly before or slightly after they were supposed to. For example, within 303rd BG, the 360th Squadron dropped its bombs about fifteen seconds before their own group leader (see 303rd BG’s mission report, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 406, Folder 9).

22 VIII Bomber Command Report of Operations, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 941. As the lead group, 379th BG should have been the first to drop their bombs, but it appears that the low group (384th BG) dropped fractionally earlier on this occasion.

23 As always, accurate numbers are difficult to pin down: different sources say different things. I have chosen to use the Reports of Operations of VIII Bomber Command and 1st Bombardment Wing as my main references here, and have used Roger Freeman’s The Mighty Eighth War Diary(London, 1990), the standard work on the US Eighth Air Force, to fill in any gaps. Out of the ninety-four B-17s that managed to bomb Hamburg and return home, forty-six sustained flak damage.

24 See intercepted German radio messages for 25 July, UK National Archives, AIR 40–425.

25 Enemy Aircraft Attack Data for 103rd Provisional Bombardment Combat Wing, Mission, 25 July 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 678, Folder 9.

26 See the Report of Operations for VIII Bomber Command, and for the 1st Bombardment Wing, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 941; and especially the Enemy Aircraft Attack Data for 103rd Provisional Bombardment Combat Wing, Mission, 25 July 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 678, Folder 9.

27 See pencil charts, detailing attacks on each individual aircraft in 384th BG, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1081, Folder 8.

28 Brad Summers, quoted in Ken Decker, Memories of the 384th Bomb Group(New York, 2005), p. 15.

29 Ibid., p. 16.

30 Philip Dreiseszun, 381st BG website.

31 Ibid.

32 Again, there are some slight discrepancies in the numbers. The 103rd Provisional Bombardment Wing data show that 379th BG was attacked only fifteen times, but the pencil charts prepared by the bomb group suggest that there were twenty attacks, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 940, Folder 14. Likewise, the 103rd Wing data show eighty attacks on 384th BG, but the bomb group records suggest that there were 122, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1081, Folder 8. The lower estimate in each case is more likely, since there was a tendency for double-counting in the bomb groups.

33 While this legend cannot be confirmed, Robert C. King, a B-24 pilot with 485th BG, claims he witnessed an instance where an American bomber from another group did this, and ‘from that mission on the Luftwaffe targeted that group and annihilated it’. See Robert C. King interview, 30 November 1994, Oral History Archives of World War II, Tape 1, Side B, Rutgers University.

34 This man was believed to be the navigator in aircraft 075, flown by Lieutenant Hegewald. See the story of the attack on aircraft 883, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1081, Folder 8.

35 Ibid.

36 Staff Sergeant George Ursta, Story of Attack, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1081, Folder 8.

37 Unteroffizier Friedrich Abromeit, IV/NJG I, quoted in Middle-brook, Battle of Hamburg, p. 215.

38 See the summary of intercepted German radio messages, 25 July, UK National Archives, AIR 40/425.

39 See the description of Mission no. 53 on 303rd Bomb Group Association’s CDRom, The Molesworth Story(2nd edition). Yankee Doodle Dandywas Aircraft 42–5264.

40 Ibid. Grimm’s DFC was awarded in 1992, forty-seven years after the paperwork requesting it had been lost.

41 According to Paul Gordy, quoted in Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, p. 219.

13    The Americans Again

1 William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power – Economic and Military(New York, 1925), p. 163. Mitchell argued that to face such dangers required extraordinary moral qualities, so the fledgling US Air Force should only accept men of the highest calibre.

2 For all the statistics in the following paragraphs, except where otherwise stated, see VIII Bomber Command Report of Operations, and the 1st Bombardment Wing Report of Operations, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 941. Statistics for missions other than those to Hamburg are taken from Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Diary(London, 1990).

3 As always, there is some discrepancy in the statistics. These numbers are taken from the 1st Bombardment Wing Report of Operations for 25 July; but the VIII Bomber Command ‘Analysis of Enemy Aircraft Encounters’ for the day lists forty-four destroyed, six probables and twenty-eight damaged (a copy of this is available in the UK National Archives, AIR 40/425). Either way, the figures are greatly exaggerated.

4 These figures for German fighters lost are Martin Middlebrook’s, in The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), p. 218. His figures are not always reliable (for example, he says the Americans claimed forty-one enemy aircraft destroyed when the 1st Bombardment Wing Report of Operations lists thirty-eight), but the main point still stands: American claims were vastly inflated.

5 See Freeman, Mighty Eighth War Diary, pp. 78–83 for exact figures: between 24 and 31 July 1943, the USAAF despatched 1672 B-17s and 261 B-26s to twenty-three different target areas.

6 See 303rd BG Report on Mission, 26 July 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 729, Folder 2. See also VIII Bomber Command Narrative of Operations, Mission No. 77, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 941, Folder 1; and Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, pp. 223–4.

7 See VIII Bomber Command Narrative of Operations, Mission No. 77, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 941, Folder 1.

8 See 1st Bombardment Wing Narrative of Operations, 26 July 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 941, Folder 1. For 351st BG reasons for abortive missions, see their Mission Summary Report, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1002, Folder 22.

9 The flak, though intense, was ‘somewhat lighter than that experienced in the raid of 25 July’. In 351st BG, for example, only a quarter of the planes were damaged by flak, compared with three-quarters the day before. See Group Leader’s Narrative, and Mission Summary Report, 351st BG, 26 July 1943, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1002, Folder 22.

10 See Immediate Interpretation Report, No. S.A.417, UK National Archives, AIR 40/426.

11 Martin Middlebrook claims wrongly that this plane was called Local Girlby her crew (see Battle of Hamburg, p. 231), but the 91st BG website is adamant that it was called Nitemare. See Lowell L. Getz’s 2001 article ‘Mary Ruth Memories of Mobile… We Still Remember’ on the 91st Group website:http://www.91stbombgroup.com/maryruth4.htm (last viewed 22 June 2005). The name is backed up by Roger Freeman and David Osborne, The B-17 Flying Fortress Story(London, 1998), p. 88.

12 See US Bomber Command Narrative of Operations, and 351st BG’s Teletype Field Order No. 172 A, Narrative, US National Archives RG18, E7, Box 1002, Folder 22.

14    The Eye of the Storm

1 Clem McCarthy, radio commentator, describing boxer Max Schmeling seconds before the ‘Brown Bomber’, Joe Louis, knocked him out in the famous 1938 world heavyweight title fight; quoted by David Margolick, Beyond Glory: Joe Louis vs. Max Schmeling, and a World on the Brink(London, 2005), p. 298.

2 These are British reconnaissance observations; see Immediate Interpretation Report Nos S.A. 410, and S.A. 417, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257; and Supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K.1626, UK National Archives, AIR 40/426. American intelligence reports agree, but are slightly less detailed: see US Immediate Interpretation Report Nos 9 and 10, US National Archives, RG18, E7, Box 1040, Folder 3.

3 Rudolf Schurig, quoted in Rudolf Wolter, Erinnerung an Gomorrha(Hamburg, 2003), p. 125.

4 Hiltgunt Zassenhaus, quoted in Volker Hage (ed.), Hamburg 1943: Literarische Zeugnisse Zum Feuersturm(Frankfurt am Main, 2003), p. 165.

5 See Hamburg damage report, UK National Archives, AIR 40/426; Hans Brunswig, Feuersturm über Hamburg(Stuttgart, 2003), pp. 198–9, 202–6; Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), pp. 153 and 155–9. See also eyewitness reports by, among others, Ilse Grassmann, Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeberg; and Erwin Garvens, Heinrich Reincke, Franz Termer and Vilma Mönckeberg-Kollmar, in Renate Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe vom Sommer 1943 in Augenzeugenberichten(Hamburg, 1993).

6 Hamburg Police Report, pp. 32–3, UK National Archives, AIR 20/7287.

7 Hiltgunt Zassenhaus, in Hage (ed.), Hamburg 1943, p. 162.

8 Ibid., pp. 161–2.

9 Franz Termer, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophepp. 51–2.

10 ‘Klöntreff “Eimsbüttel im Feuersturm”’, unpublished transcript of local-history group conversation, Galerie Morgenland/Geschichtwerkstatt, Sprecherin 2, p. 12.

11 Indeed, Goebbels himself had insisted that taxes on cinema and theatre tickets would not be raised for this very reason. See Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner (London, 1948), 20 March 1943, p. 241.

12 Many eyewitness reports from the time attest to how much the loss of these buildings distressed people. See, for example, the testimonies by Franz Termer and Vilma Mönckeberg-Kollmar, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, pp. 50–51 and 54.

13 Official report, ‘Bericht über die Katastrophennacht am 25.7.43 im Tierpark Carl Hagenbeck’, sent to the author by Klaus Gille, Hagenbeck Tierpark.

14 Middlebrook claims the animals were killed by American bombs (see Battle of Hamburg, p. 201), but he misinterprets the account in the Hamburg Police Report: when it says they died in the ‘second attack’, it means the second largeattack – i.e., the British night raid of 27/28 July.

15 For witnesses to the destruction of these churches, see Ilse Grassmann, Ausgebombt: Ein Hausfrauen Kriegstagebuch von Ilse Grassmann(Hamburg, 2003), p. 22; and Otto Johns and Heinrich Reincke, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, pp. 28 and 39.

16 Hauptpastor Simon Schöffel in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 23.

17 Hiltgunt Zassenhaus, in Hage (ed.), Hamburg 1943, p. 166; Erwin Garvens, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 37.

18 Erwin Garvens, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 37.

19 In the chaos that followed the first night of attacks, all the city’s newspapers had been forced to merge into one: the Hamburger Zeitung. However, since there was only enough paper to print this on a single sheet, it was really only an emergency organ for getting essential messages to the people about where they could find rations and water, who could leave the city, and so on.

20 Renate Hauschild-Thiessen, Unternehmen Gomorrha(Hamburg, 1993), p. 25.

21 Fredy Borck, in Kerstin Hof (ed), Rothenburgsort 27/28 Juli 1943, p. 10.

22 ‘Die Papierblättchen sind harmlos’, Hamburger Zeitung, 26 July 1943.

23 ‘Gegen sinnlose Gerüchte’, ibid., 27 July 1943.

24 For this, and the rest of the disaster plan, see the Hamburg Police Report, pp. 70–86 and Appendix 7.

25 Wilhelm Küper, in Hauschild-Thiessen, Die Hamburger Katastrophe, p. 30.

26 Erwin Garvens, in ibid., pp. 36–7.

27 See Hamburg Police Report, p. 4; and Hamburger Zeitung, 26 July 1943.

28 See ‘Sonderzuteilung an die Bevölkerung’, and ‘Warmes Essen durch Groβküchen’, Hamburger Zeitung, 25 and 26 July 1943.

29 Hamburg Police Report, p. 70.

15    Concentrated Bombing

1 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (London, 1943), p. 22.

2 See 139 Squadron Operational Record Book, UK National Archives, AIR 27/960. Such nuisance raids were extremely effective. Earlier in the year Joseph Goebbels had complained that ‘ten nuisance planes drove fifteen to eighteen million people out of bed’: Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, trans. and ed. P. Lochner (London, 1948), 16 May 1943, p. 301. On this occasion, some German firefighters and rescue workers were convinced that the nuisance raid was specifically aimed at preventing their work. The fact that so many fire-fighters were still concentrated in the west of the city on the following night contributed to the catastrophe.

3 Bomber Command Intelligence Narrative of Operations No. 651, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

4 For that night’s plan, see D Form, 27 July, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

5 See Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg(London, 1980), pp. 235 and 242. While some bombers might indeed have strayed over this city, it was by no means part of the plan: the actual route took the bomber stream some sixteen miles or so to the west of Lübeck. See the RAF Operational Summary, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

6 On 24 July 724 planes dropped 1349.6 tons of high explosive, and 932 tons of incendiaries on Hamburg. On 27 July 721 planes dropped 1104.4 tons of high explosive, and 1174 tons of incendiaries. In the second attack, therefore, approximately the same number of planes dropped 245 tons less of high explosive, and 242 tons more of incendiaries. See Operational Summaries, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

7 See Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, p. 235.

8 UK National Archives, AIR 24/257.

9 Group Captains H. I. Edwards VC, from Binbrook; S. C. Elworthy, from Waddington; H. L. Patch, from Coningsby: A. D. Ross, from Middleton St George; and A. H. Willets, from Oakington.

10 See UK National Archives, AIR 27/687, which mentions General Anderson’s trip to Essen, but not his flight to Hamburg. However, Middlebrook, who corresponded with Anderson, is adamant that he did indeed fly to Hamburg on this raid; see Battle of Hamburg, p. 236.

11 The rendezvous point that night was at 54.30N 07.00E.

12 Herrmann himself later implied that it was his disregard for the dangers of flying into their own flak that gave the Wilde Sautactics their name; see Hajo Herrmann, Bewegtes Leben(Stuttgart, 1984), p. 256.

13 For the early history of Herrmann’s ‘Wild Boars’, including the attack on Hamburg, see ibid., chapters 10 and 11, pp. 247–307.

14 Ibid., p. 273.

15 See Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, p. 248 and Gordon Musgrove, Operation Gomorrah(London, 1981), p. 73. According to the RAF Operational Record Book for the Pathfinder Force, the original plan was for red TIs to be used if, and only if, crews were 100 per cent sure that they had identified the correct aiming point. However, the final report seems to indicate that red TIs were never used. See UK National Archives, AIR 25/156, AIR 14/3410.

16 Other historians give very different figures for the number of aeroplanes that bombed Hamburg on this night. Max Hastings says 722, Robin Neillands 735, Martin Middlebrook 729, the American historian Earl R. Beck 722, the German historian Uwe Bahnsen 739. While this might look to the layman like errors of research, it is quite common to find different figures in different official documents. For example, the US Strategic Bombing Survey gives the number that bombed as 739, citing the RAF Operational Summary as its source. However, the RAF summary (issued eight days after the attack) gives 736. To further complicate matters, the appendices of the RAF Operations Summary claim that only 721 aircraft bombed the primarytarget – presumably indicating that fifteen aircraft dropped their bombs on targets other than Hamburg, see Bomber Command Intelligence Narrative of Operations No. 651, UK National Archives, AIR 24/257. There are occasionally different figures in other sources, and it is easy to get bogged down in such minor details. Here, therefore, as elsewhere, I have assumed that the final official intelligence report issued by the force that carried out the attack is most likely to be accurate, and have given their figure accordingly, UK National Archives, AIR 14/3410. All figures quoted in this chapter are from the same source, unless otherwise specified.

17 Colin Harrison, interview with the author, 8 December 2004.

18 Bill McCrea, interview with the author, 8 December 2004.

19 Trevor Timperley, interview with the author, 17 November 2004.

20 Leonard Cooper, telephone interview with the author, 19 November 2004.

21 For a fuller description of this engagement, see Musgrove, Operation Gomorrah, p. 76.

22 According to Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, p. 245. The general claims, though not the exact time and altitude, are backed up by Peter Hinchliffe, in The Other Battle(Shrewsbury, 2001), p. 157.

23 Quoted by Middlebrook, Battle of Hamburg, pp. 246–7.

24 Ted Groom, telephone interview with the author, 11 November 2004.

25 F. H. Quick, private manuscript diary sent to the author.

16    Firestorm

1 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. Alastair Fowler, Book II, lines 170–76 (London, 1968), pp. 97–8. These words are spoken by Belial in the depths of hell, as he warns the rebel angels of the possible consequences of embarking upon a new war.

2 See Chapter 10, in particular the passages relating to notes 47 and 48.

3 For a discussion of the different types of firestorm, see Gordon Musgrove, Operation Gomorrah(London, 1981), pp. 102–3.

4 According to Hans Brunswig, who was the senior fire engineer on duty that night, the wind speeds probably reached 75 metres per second and more; see his Feuersturm über Hamburg(Stuttgart, 2003), p. 266. Charles H. V. Ebert prefers a lower estimate of about 50 metres per second; see his ‘The meteorological factor in the Hamburg Firestorm’, in Weatherwise, vol. 16, no. 2 (April 1963), p. 73.

5 Ebert, Weatherwise. For an eyewitness account, see the situation report given by the head of FE-Bereitschaft 3/X (‘Fire Service Stand-by Crew 3/X’), quoted in Brunswig, Feuersturm, p. 232: the whirlwind at the junction of Vogelweide and Volksdorfer Strasse in Eilbek was strong enough to lift large pieces of burning wood from a timber merchant and send them hurtling down the street.

6 Police engineers in Hamburg estimated that general temperatures were more likely around 800°C – see Horatio Bond, Fire and the Air War(Boston, 1946), p. 116. Bond was a US adviser to the USSBS in Hamburg after the war.

7 For a much more detailed analysis of how weather conditions contributed to this firestorm, see Ebert, Weatherwise, pp. 70–75. According to Ebert, this firestorm is ‘unmatched in the records’.

8 See Musgrove, Operation Gomorrah, p. 109; and Brunswig, Feuersturm, pp. 271–2.

9 Indeed, the Germans took great pains to keep their findings about the meteorological factor in such firestorms secret. Ibid., p. 270.

10 For contemporary theories on the relative effectiveness of incendiary bombing over high explosives, see J. Enrique Zanetti, Fire from the Air: The ABC of Incendiaries(New York, 1941), particularly pp. 49–50.

11 See the British official history, Solly Zuckerman’s The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939–45: Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit(London, 1998), p. 6: ‘the technical lessons of the German attacks on our cities were beginning to be driven home, and it was becoming more and more recognized that, in order to destroy built-up areas, incendiary bombs, and medium-charge and high-charge HE bombs were preferable to the types of load that we were then employing.’ For British and German experiments and development of incendiaries, see also Frederick Taylor, Dresden(London, 2004), pp. 113–15.

12 Hamburg Police Report, p.16, UK National Archives, AIR 20/7287. The original German is in Erhard Klöss (ed.), Der Luftkrieg über Deutschland 1939–45: Deutsche Berichte und Pressestimmen des neutralen Auslands, p. 41.